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2“And come he slow, or come he fast,
It is but Death who comes at last.”
         Sir Walter Scott
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5Abstract
The research aims to establish whether processes around the consideration and execution of the
living will help enhance the doctor-patient relationship.  Studies have shown that the living will
is not used frequently, and that the doctor-patient relationship is often deficient.  The research
explores the two primary topics – the living will, and the doctor-patient relationship – separately.
Each primary topic is approached via a consideration of the relevant literature, and each is then
analyzed from a theoretical–ethical point of view.  A synthesis of these separate investigations is
presented.   This synthesis  concludes  that  the living will  can help enhance  the doctor-patient
relationship.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter will briefly provide introductory details concerning my research report.  Section 1.1
will provide a brief summary of the research question and an outline of the topics into which this
research will delve.  Section 1.2 will detail the specific objectives for this research.  Section 1.3
will explain the structure of the arguments in this research and the manner in which they are
presented.
1.1. Introductory Summary
This research aims to determine whether the living will could be used to facilitate delicate and
often difficult discussions regarding end-of-life treatment, and death, between patients and their
doctors.  Recent studies, appraisals of which will constitute a large component of Chapters 2, 3
and 4, have shown that, for the most part, both patients – especially those over 65 and those with
a terminal disease  -  and doctors believe that  discussing end-of-life care and dying would be
beneficial in the continuous quest to improve patient care.  
Such discussions  would in  particular  further  the  ends  of  patient  autonomy,  beneficence  and
informed consent which have become ethical issues at the forefront of medical practice.  In spite
of these potential benefits, many patients remain unwilling to discuss death with their doctor.  At
the same time, many doctors remain unwilling to discuss death and end-of-life care with their
patients.  This could be because the idea of death, and discussions about it, are ‘taboo’.  Often it
is also a psychologically uncomfortable area for both doctors and their patients.  
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As a  possible  solution  to  the  above  concerns,  this  research  aims  to  determine  whether  the
introduction of the subject of the living will – either by the doctor or by the patient – could,
through the ensuing discussions, help facilitate a better doctor-patient relationship.  The living
will is a document referring specifically to end-of-life care and death.  May it be considered a
stratagem for enhancing patient autonomy, patient privacy at the end of life, and for allowing
individuals some manner of control over their death in the event of incompetence?
1.2. Objectives    
The overall objective of this research is to determine whether the living will could be used as a
means to initiate and facilitate delicate discussions regarding end-of-life care and planning for
death.
The specific objectives of my research are as follows:
A. To evaluate the perceived value of the living will to both patients and medical personnel.
B. To  establish  whether  regular  doctor-patient  communication  could  ensure  that  the  level  of
informed consent remains ethically acceptable
C. To  evaluate  the  perceived  importance  of  the  doctor-patient  relationship  according  to
patients and medical personnel.
D. To discuss some barriers towards end-of-life discussions, and the unwillingness, on the
part of both doctors and patients, to talk about death.
E. To briefly propose a system by which living wills may become more commonplace and
hence  may  serve  to  facilitate  end-of-life  discussions  and  enhance  the  doctor-patient
relationship.
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These will be dealt with throughout this research report.  Discussions and conclusions regarding
these specific objectives will enhance the overall argument of this thesis.
1.3. Presentation of Arguments
This research report takes the form of three chapters (2, 3 and 4) concerning the body of the
research and the main research question.  The conclusions are presented in Chapter 5.
Chapter  2  has  as  its  subject  the  living  will.   It  presents  a  background  to  current  thinking
regarding this concept and it explores some of the frequently voiced pros and cons.  This chapter
contains  findings  relevant  to  specific  objectives  A and B.   It  will  conclude  with  an ethical
analysis.
Chapter 3 focuses on the doctor-patient relationship.  Its structure follows that of Chapter 2.  It
concerns specific objectives C and D.  It also concludes with an ethical analysis.
Chapter 4 is a synthesis of findings from Chapters 2 and 3.  This synthesis helps provide an
affirmative answer to the overall research question of whether the living will could enhance the
doctor-patient relationship.
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Chapter 2: The Living Will
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I will consider the living will and advance directive in more detail.1  I will begin
with  a  literature  review  in  section  2.2.   This  review  will  consider  articles  published
predominantly in established medical journals and bioethics textbooks.  I will explore literature
both for and against living wills from a practical and ethical point of view.  Following this, I will
consider the first two specific objectives of this research in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 respectively:
A. To evaluate the perceived value of the living will to both patients and medical personnel.
B. To  establish  whether  regular  doctor-patient  communication  could  ensure  that  the  level  of
informed consent remains ethically acceptable.
In Section 2.5 I will present an ethical analysis of the concept of a living will, arguing that it
furthers the ends of ethical medical practice, and hence should be encouraged.
2.2. Literature Review
2.2.1. The Practicalities of the Living Will
1 I will use the terms living will and advance directive interchangeably from this point forward as they refer to the
same thing.
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In his article entitled Sharing Death and Dying: Advance Directives, Autonomy and the Family
Mun Chan (2004: 88), offers some insight into what exactly constitutes a living will and its uses.
He begins by noting that the concept of an advance directive is a liberal one and claims that it
has arisen in response to medical practice which was considered over-paternalistic.  He then
distinguishes between two types of advance directive.  The first is an ‘instructional directive’
which  “states  a  competent  patient’s  instructions  for  healthcare  when  she  lapses  into
incompetency” (ibid: 89).  The second is a ‘proxy directive’ which “appoints another person to
make healthcare decisions on the patient’s behalf when she loses the ability to decide for herself”
(ibid: 90).  
The concept of the ‘instructional directive’ is essentially simple, though it can run into problems
which are,  however,  beyond the scope of this research.   The instructional  directive specifies
one’s preferences for treatment by means of a written set of medical instructions.  This is then
signed  and dated.   It  takes  precedence  over  a  familial  proxy,  though is  thought  to  be most
effective if used in conjunction with a familial proxy.  
Mun Chan then considers the proper role of the proxy when it comes to the proxy directive.  In
order to make a properly informed decision the proxy should “consider the personality, moral
values and religious beliefs of the incompetent patient in order to try and understand what she
would have decided if she had known, while being competent, that she would be in the situation
facing the surrogate decision maker” (ibid: 90 – 91).  
Closer to home, The Living Will Society of South Africa more closely restricts the concept of the
living will by noting that its main function is to aid in the “refusal of artificial life-support when
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dying” (Living Will Society 2008).  This society provides a framework for the creation of a
living will as well as the support necessary to have the will carried out in the appropriate manner.
The vast majority of literature regarding living wills stresses that the concept is still imperfect
and that much needs to be done to refine it and make it more effective.  Some of the practical
problems with living wills, as debated in the literature, will now be discussed.  
In  their  article  Living Wills  and DNR:  is  Patient  Safety Compromised? Mirarchi  and Conti
(2007:  66)  point  out  that  living wills  are  not  individualized and that  they are often open to
misinterpretation.  Often, it is claimed, they lack individualization as they are created using a
template which may not incorporate the specific and specialized needs of each patient (ibid: 66).
Furthermore,  they  “may  not  express  the  patients’  true  wishes”  and  the  living  will  is  often
automatically interpreted as a DNR [Do Not Resuscitate] order” (ibid).  The justification for the
claim that the living will may not represent a patient’s true wishes is that living wills are often
left on file for years.  The patient tends not to update it, thereby not incorporating any changes in
personal  opinion,  nor  advances  in  medical  technology  (ibid:  67).   In  his  scathing  criticism
concerning living wills, Tonelli notes that another problematic aspect of living wills is that they
are  often  unavailable  in  an  emergency  or  are  “not  applicable  in  many  situations  involving
critically ill patients” (Tonelli 1996: 816).  
Although a substantial portion of the literature review has shown that the living will is often
criticized,  other  literature  suggests  that  it  can  be  of  great  use  if  properly  implemented  and
maintained.   Kuhse  and  Singer  (2006:  262  –  263)  explore  reasons  why the  living  will  has
become desirable.  Firstly, even though medicine is continually increasing its capacity to prolong
life,  this  has  not  been  matched  by  its  ability  to  restore  function  and  wellbeing  (ibid:  262).
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Secondly, for many today, the period before death is one characterised by a certain amount of
mental  incapacity.   Given  this  state  of  affairs,  the  living  will  presents  an  attractive  option,
allowing a previously competent person to direct his or her medical treatment when he or she
lapses into incompetency (ibid).  
2.2.2. A Practical Example
An example of how a living will might have been beneficial, and saved many people a great
amount of stress and grief, can be demonstrated by applying it to the Nancy Cruzan case.  
On January 11th 1983, 24 year-old Cruzan lost control of her car on an isolated stretch of road in
Missouri, USA.  Although paramedics on the scene managed to restart Nancy’s heart, her brain
had been anoxic for fifteen minutes and she did not regain consciousness (Pence 2008: 28).
Nancy remained in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) for 7 years following her accident.  As the
years went by, her body became rigid, her fingernails claw-like and her hands tightly clenched.
She had to be rotated in her bed every two hours in order to prevent bed sores.  She drooled
continuously, leaving her hair and pillows wet and clammy (ibid).  Furthermore, Nancy could
not swallow and thus she had to be fed by a tube inserted into her stomach (ibid: 29).  
Nancy’s parents believed that she would not have wanted to exist in such a state.  Thus, they
sought permission in court to disconnect Nancy’s feeding tube and allow nature to take its course
(ibid).  The Missouri Supreme Court ruled against the Cruzans, stating that, in the absence of an
explicit advance directive authored by Nancy,  they had not produced “clear and convincing”
evidence that she would not have wished to exist in such a state (ibid).  
Important here is the ruling of the court.  It is apparent that this ruling would have been very
different had Nancy made a living will.  Should she have done so, she would not have been kept
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alive in a manner she may well have deemed unacceptable and demeaning.  She would also have
been able to express her explicit wishes as to her treatment should the time arise that she became
mentally incapacitated.  Instead, due to the absence of a living will, a string of court appearances
and appeals led to Nancy being kept alive for a far lengthier period than would have been the
case had she made a living will.  Eventually, in mid-1990, after a relentless, emotionally draining
legal  battle,  intensely  scrutinized  by  the  media,  the  Cruzans  won  permission  to  disconnect
Nancy’s feeding tube.  She died on December 14th, 1990 (ibid: 31).
The case of Nancy Cruzan also illustrates another, perhaps more cynical, way in which a living
will could have been beneficial, not to Nancy, but to the general public.  During her seven years
in a PVS, Cruzan’s care cost the State of Missouri US$ 130 000 per year (ibid: 28).  Thus, the
total cost of Nancy’s hospitalization was US$ 910 000.  Had she written a living will, and her life
not been unreasonably prolonged, the State would have saved the state a vast sum of money.
This saving could have been channeled elsewhere, perhaps to somebody who would truly benefit
from the medical care such money promised.  It may seem to many somewhat harsh to apply a
financial analysis to Cruzan’s tragic case.  However, scarcity of resources is a medical reality
worldwide and it should not be overlooked.  From this societal point of view, a living will may
be beneficial, by helping to channel medical resources away from patients who do not wish to
use them, especially at a cost to others.
2.2.3. Ethics and the Living Will
Many ethical concepts are at play when it comes to living wills.  Among these are:
• Autonomy, 
• Informed consent,
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• Beneficence.  
Discussion of the living will also tends to open up the euthanasia debate to some extent.  In
Section 2.2.3 of the literature review, I will consider the literature under these four categories.
2.2.3.1. Autonomy
The vast majority of literature regarding the living will emphasizes the concept of autonomy2.  It
will be explored in much greater detail in Section 3.4.2.  
In Pulling the Plug on Living Wills (see Section 2.2.1. above), Tonelli considers autonomy and
its implications for the living will.  He (1996: 816) begins by claiming that “the recent emphasis
placed on patient autonomy within medical ethics has had a profound influence not only on the
practice of medicine, but on the concept of autonomy itself”.  Indeed, he argues that autonomy
has become “so integral to medical decision making that it is advocated as a guiding principle
even  in  individuals who are no longer  autonomous” (ibid).   He goes  on to  suggest  that  the
advance  directive  has  come  about  in  response  to  the  assertion  that  “the  right  of  self-
determination is not lost in incompetent, and therefore non-autonomous, patients” (ibid).
2.2.3.2. Informed Consent
2 Autonomy is the ability to be self-determining.  An agent can only be truly autonomous if he or she is familiar
with all the intricacies of his or her situation.  In medicine, autonomy is preserved by means of informed consent,
defined in Footnote 3 below.
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Mirarchi and Conti focus on the issue of informed consent.3  Notwithstanding the claims made
by the Living Will Society (see Section 2.2.1. above), Mirarchi and Conti (2007: 67) claim that
“Living wills lack the process of informed consent”.  This is because when a patient makes a
living will he or she is often not made aware of all possibilities that may be available.  The
information regarding possible life-ending and life-sustaining treatments  as it  is  provided by
doctors is often generic and may not be discussed in sufficient detail to allow a living will to be
signed with fully informed consent (ibid).  
2.2.3.3. Beneficence
Tonelli  (1996)  also  discusses  the  principle  of  beneficence.   The  ethical  intricacies  of  this
principle  are  explored  in  more  detail  in  Section  3.4.3.   He  argues  that  the  notion  of  the
beneficent, paternalistic doctor – one who always acts in the best interests of his patient - should
not fall by the wayside.  
In order to make his point he uses the example of a once famous mathematician who now has
dementia.  He notes that this patient is always smiling, seems contented with his lot and when
questioned about his contentment replies in the affirmative.  This is the case in spite of the fact
that when the mathematician was lucid he “held [his] cognitive powers in the highest regard”
(ibid: 817).  These powers were held in such high regard, in fact, that the mathematician had
made a living will stating “quite unequivocally and even in writing, that he would prefer not to
exist  rather  than  live  without  them”  (ibid).   Tonelli  (ibid)  then  goes  on  to  claim that  it  is
3 Informed consent entails that a patient has thorough knowledge of the nature and extent of risk concurrent with
a medical procedure.  Furthermore, the patient must show appreciation and understanding of the risks and
benefits of a procedure.  The patient is then in a position to make an informed consent to the entire medical
procedure, including its consequences (McQuoid-Mason 2008: Handout).
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reasonable to assert that this mathematician is not the person he used to be and thus not the same
person who wrote the living will.  
The  ethical  dilemma  here  concerns,  on  the  one  hand,  respect  for  the  autonomy  of  the
mathematician  versus,  on  the  other,  paternalistic  beneficence  which  recognises  that  this
mathematician is happy in his present state (indeed he does not even remember the previous
extent of his cognitive powers).
Simonds (2003) considers beneficence from a different perspective.  He claims that a beneficent
doctor has a duty to “do all he can to palliate symptoms and maintain or even prolong a quality
of life that is acceptable to the individual” (ibid: 276).  A patient’s living will dictates what he or
she considers an acceptable quality of life.4  A beneficent doctor then, is one who adheres to the
wishes expressed in the living will.
2.2.3.4. Euthanasia
Here the euthanasia debate comes into play.5  The case of the mathematician mentioned above is
one that would demand an act of active euthanasia on the part of the doctor in order to fulfill the
request of the living will.  This is still beyond the compass of the law in most countries and it
4 The “Quality of Life” debate has become a central issue in Bioethics.  The two primary positions are as follows:
There is the more liberal position which advocates that nobody should have to live a life which they judge to be of
an unacceptable quality.  For instance, an Olympic athlete may consider life as a quadriplegic after a car accident of
unacceptable quality.  Then there is the more conservative, religious position.  This position stresses that God gave
us our lives and he determined the route they would take.  This faction advocates against a subjective judgement
regarding quality of life, claiming rather that this judgment is up to God.
5 There are three categories of euthanasia and each category has it own unique, distinguishing properties.  The first
distinction is between Active and Passive euthanasia.  Active euthanasia entails using an active means to bring
about death, for instance a lethal injection.  Passive euthanasia occurs when a person refuses to intervene in order
to prevent death, for instance the decision not to ventilate a patient.  The second distinction is between Assisted
and Unassisted euthanasia.  Assisted euthanasia occurs when one requires the assistance of an outsider to die.
Unassisted euthanasia involves taking one’s own life and is thought of as suicide.  The third distinction is between
Voluntary, Involuntary and Non-voluntary euthanasia.  Voluntary euthanasia occurs when a person explicitly
agrees to the procedure.  Involuntary euthanasia takes place against the explicit wishes of the agent and is
considered murder.  Non-voluntary euthanasia occurs when the subject is not positioned to gauge the situation,
for instance an infant who is allowed to die due to illness (Van Bogaert 2007 (a): 750 – 753).
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highlights an important problem with living wills: the requests they make of doctors often extend
beyond what is permitted within the scope of the law.  In some cases euthanasia is also unethical,
but this debate is beyond the scope of this research.  
2.3 Specific Objective A: The Living Will, Healthcare Professionals and Patients
This section deals with the specific objective of establishing the perceived value of the living
will to medical personnel and patients.
2.3.1. The Living Will and its Perceived Importance to Healthcare Professionals
A study conducted amongst geriatrician members of the British Geriatrics Society regarding the
living will yielded some interesting results.  In the study entitled  Living Wills and the Mental
Capacity Act, Schiff et. al. (2006: 116) found that many of the geriatricians practicing in Britain
had experience with the living will.  Most of this had been positive and many geriatricians felt
that  the  living  will  was  useful  (ibid:  118).   The  main  reasons  for  this  sentiment  were  the
following:  
• The living will was seen as a tool which allowed doctors to easily carry out patients’
wishes for “less invasive, predominantly palliative care at the end-of-life” (ibid).  
• The living will meant that those who had requested to die at home were much more likely
to actually do so (ibid).  
In  spite  of  the  positive  response  to  the  living  will,  studies  show  that  many  healthcare
professionals are themselves unwilling to actually sign such a document.  A study by Go et. al.
(2007)  looked  into  Advance  Directives  Amongst  Healthcare  Professionals  at  a  Community
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Based Cancer Centre.  In spite of the fact that the 134 study participants worked closely with
terminally ill patients, it emerged that only 35% had actually executed advance directives for
themselves  (ibid:  1487).   The  study  found,  however,  that  this  was  due  to  a  lack  of  easily
accessible documentation rather than to the fact that the participants did not believe the living
will to be potentially valuable.  Of those who had not executed an advance directive, most in this
study said they intended to do so.
2.3.2. The Living Will and its Perceived Importance to Patients
Studies considered in this section reveal that, like healthcare professionals, patients usually feel
that a living will could be of great  importance when it comes to the direction of their future
medical care.
For  example,  Simonds (2003:  276) found that  the presence  of a  living will  “provides  many
individuals with comfort and reassurance that the care they receive will be in accordance with
their wishes.”  He also noted that a recent survey of elderly people living in London found that,
once informed of the possibility of a living will, 74% expressed a desire for their own (ibid:
278).  This finding suggests that knowledge about living wills is scarce amongst patients.  The
means to make a living will - in the form of easily accessible documentation - also seems limited
amongst patients, as it is amongst doctors.
Although there are some problems with living wills, practicing medicine in an ethical fashion
must always be prioritized.  It is clear from the literature reviewed that patients are enthusiastic
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about the living will.  Restricting its use, then, is failure to recognize a patient’s autonomous
choice, should he or she wish to make a living will.  Similarly, restricting the use of the living
will is not beneficent in the case of a patient  who is keen to make one.   Given the positive
attitude of patients towards the living will, it appears that medical practitioners should aim to
promote and implement them widely.
2.4. Specific Objective B: The Living Will, Ethics and Informed Consent
This  section  deals  with  specific  objective  B:  establishing  whether  regular  doctor-patient
communication could ensure that the level of informed consent remains ethically acceptable.  
Since medical advances in the future cannot be predicted with certainty, consent in a living will
can  never  really  be  “fully”  informed.   However,  it  appears  that  good  doctor-patient
communication regarding the living will can make any consent as fully informed as possible.
2.4.1. Why the Emphasis on Informed Consent?
Many of the specific problems relating to the living will concern the uncertainty inherent within
them.  Pence (2006: 49) sums up the two most prominent concerns:  
• It  has been found that most people do not accurately predict their sentiments towards
extraordinary medical treatment when they are actually near death.  Sentiments change
over time and often those who presently claim to dislike the idea of being kept alive at all
costs change their minds as they near dying.
• Studies have shown that those designated as legal proxies cannot ascertain the wishes of
previously competent, but now incompetent, individuals with any measure of accuracy.6
6 Pence does not explicitly address the issue of how to ascertain whether proxies are accurate or inaccurate.  This
would require some kind of response from the patient, by definition incompetent in these situations.  It is possible
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Both of these points relate to informed consent.  As medical technology advances, it is important
that a living will-maker consents to, or refuses, new treatments.  Then any change in sentiment
will be well informed by knowledge of the treatment available.  Proxy decision makers, who will
make decisions for the patient upon his or her incompetence, are giving an informed consent on
behalf of the patient.  For this consent to be as informed as possible, it is important that the proxy
is familiar with the patient’s sentiments and changes therein.
2.4.2. A Possible Solution
These important points suggest that those who make a living will should not do so lightly.  They
must be made aware that their sentiments may change, and that they must review the living will
at  regular  intervals.   They must  also  be  sure  to  continually  inform their  designated  proxies
concerning their wishes in the case of incompetence.  This should constitute a component of a
frequent review process.  The patient must be made aware of the benefits of this, as well as the
dangers of infrequent reviews.  
This regular review depends upon good communication.  It  is very important that the patient
discuss his or her wishes with both doctor and designated proxies. The role of the doctor should
be to facilitate the review of the living will, and to help encourage his or her patient to keep it up
to  date.   Time  should  be  taken  to  explain  advances  in  medical  technology  to  the  patient.
Changes in sentiment on the part  of the patient  should also be evaluated and the living will
that studies regarding the correlation between proxy decisions and the patient’s actual wishes could be conducted
using the patient’s living will as a guideline.  However this is problematic, as a proxy should always be familiar with
the relevant living will.
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updated accordingly.   This information should then be disseminated amongst  proxies by the
patient, ideally both verbally and in writing.
By its conventional definition, informed consent is ‘consent to medical treatment after such a
time as the patient has been made well aware of the potential risks and benefits of the treatment’.
The informed consent process is a fluid one, and it  changes  along with sentiment as well as
technological advances in medicine.  Informed consent is possible here via consent to, or refusal
of, certain forms of medical treatment; and by consent to conscientiously re-evaluate the contents
of the living will.    If a living will represents consent to future medical treatment - and because
medical advances are frequent - then for this consent to be informed, it is vitally important that
the document is kept up to date and that proxies are kept well-versed in its contents.  
Provided the living will is kept up to date, and regularly discussed with a doctor who will explain
the risks and benefits of new medical advances; it would appear that the process of consent to,
and / or  refusal  of,  future medical  treatments,  as stipulated in the living will,  is  as ethically
justifiable as it can be.  Nobody can predict the future with certainty, but keeping a living will
current  minimizes the chance that when it  comes into effect  it  does not properly express the
autonomous choice of the person who made it.
Thus it  appears here that  discussing the living will with one’s doctor and designated proxies
could yield a more ethically sound living will.  This living will would be more ethically relevant
because, when handled as a topic to be discussed with doctor and proxies (who are often family
members or close friends)  ethical  ideals are specifically and individually considered.   These
ideals include a consent which is as ‘fully informed’ as possible, given that we are dealing with
prospective medical treatments.  Also included is beneficence, in which the doctor undertakes to
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preserve the quality of life, considered acceptable to the patient, as stipulated in his or her living
will.  
These ideals of informed consent and beneficence may be reinforced by discussions in which all
aspects related to the living will are addressed by the role players: the patient, the doctor, and
proxies.  An ethical living will is one made in the light of as many ethical ideals as possible.
This is clearly a result of these ideals being furthered by means of doctor-patient discussions and
finds  its  place  in  the element  of  trust  which is  central  to  the doctor-patient  relationship.   If
properly implemented, the use of the living will could lead to increased confidence amongst both
patients and the medical profession, as it goes some way towards allaying the doubts regarding
patient sentiment expressed in Section 2.4.1.
2.5. Ethical Analysis
Having considered the literature pertaining specifically to the living will, and the way in which
detailed discussions can yield a more ethically acceptable living will for all who wish to make
one, I will now consider the living will as a whole, and ask: “Is it ethical?”  This ethical analysis
of the living will  hinges upon two prominent ethical  theories,  Kantianism and Utilitarianism,
each of which will be discussed in turn.
2.5.1. Is the Living Will Ethical? – Kantianism
2.5.1.1. Introduction
Kant (1724 – 1804) lived during the Enlightenment and developed his theory of ethics with the
firm belief that the power of reason is sufficient to solve all human problems (Pence 2008: 162).
Kant’s Deontology was based on duty and the idea that the consequences of an action were of
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little import in comparison to the  reason for that action (ibid).  Kant encouraged people to do
their duty: to do what is right and display a “pure will” (ibid).  The first and second formulations
of Kant’s Categorical Imperative are of great importance to Bioethics and provide a useful guide
when it comes to medical decision making.  
The first formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative states:
Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can, at the same time,
will that it become a universal law (Gregor 1997: xviii).
My understanding of this first formulation is as follows:  It is like saying ‘treat others as you
would be treated by them’, but in a broader sense.  If the maxim of your action were to become a
universal law, then you too would be subject to such actions.  So if you acted towards somebody
else based on a malicious maxim, should your malicious maxim become a universal law, you
will then also be treated with malice.  
An example of the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative is as follows:  Assume Marty
wants to donate his worldly savings to charity,  preferring a life of quiet contemplation.  The
maxim of his action here is: ‘it is good to act in such a way that one donate one’s worldly savings
to charity’.  Should this maxim be a universal law, everyone would be required to donate all their
worldly savings to charity.  Categorical Imperatives are absolutes and there is no opt-out clause.
So the charities would have all the money and the people would have nothing.  This example
shows that Marty’s action of donating all his worldly savings to charity is not a good one as the
maxim of his action cannot be construed as a universal law without giving rise to a ridiculous
situation.
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When it comes to medicine, the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative advocates that a
doctor should treat patients in a manner which he or she would like all other doctors to employ,
and would be happy to experience as a patient him or her self.  
The second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, which has also become very important to
medical ethics, states:
           So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
          other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means (Gregor 1997: 38).
The second formulation may be paraphrased as: ‘always treat others with respect as autonomous
human beings and never as mere instruments’.  This means that we may not use other people
merely as instruments towards fulfilling our own goals.  This is not to say that one cannot use
another as a means to fulfilling an end.  It is important however that the autonomy of the other is
preserved. 
When it comes to medicine, this can be construed in light of informed consent and informed
refusal.   The  second  formulation  advocates  that  doctors,  for  instance,  should  not  perform
personal research experiments on their patients without their informed consent.  It is not wrong
for the doctor to use patients in his or her research, but it is wrong to use patients merely for this,
especially without consent.
An example from Nazi Germany illustrates the second formulation in a practical manner.  Dr
Josef Mengele was particularly interested in the genetic structure of the blonde haired, blue eyed
‘Aryan’  race.   These  features  were  considered  to  epitomize  the  ideal  human  under  Hitler’s
regime.  Mengele believed that twins held the genetic secrets of the Aryan race and he was under
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the impression that if an Aryan woman could assuredly give birth to blonde haired, blue eyed
twins, the future could be saved (Rosenberg 2008: 1).  Given these beliefs and the purpose of
Mengele’s research, an ideal area of operation was one where there was no shortage of twins
who could be used as specimens (ibid).  Thus Mengele entered Auschwitz concentration camp as
an experienced medical researcher in May 1943.  His experiments were funded by the German
government and he worked alongside some of the top medical researchers of that era (ibid).
The  twins  selected  for  genetic  experiments  at  Auschwitz  became  known  as  “Mengele’s
Children”.  During the course of his research Mengele carried out experiments on approximately
three thousand twins.  Only two hundred of them survived (ibid).  The experiments were brutal
in  nature:  “Blood,  often  in  large  quantities,  was  drawn  from  twins’  fingers  and  arms,  and
sometimes both of their arms simultaneously.   The youngest children, whose arms and hands
were very small, suffered the most:  Blood was drawn from their necks, a painful and frightening
procedure” (ibid: 2).  Additional experiments included the instillation of drops or injections of
chemicals into twins eyes  in  an attempt to  fabricate  a blue eye  colour.   These were  painful
procedures,  often  resulting  in  blindness.   Surgery  was  performed  on  some  twins  without
anesthesia.  These twins usually died after the third or fourth surgery, following which the final
experiment, an autopsy, would be performed (ibid).  
It  is  easy to  apply the  second  formulation  of  the  Categorical  Imperative  to  the  example  of
“Mengele’s  Children”.   Although  they  were  children  and  as  such  may  not  have  explicitly
formulated their own ends and what exactly these might be, I believe it is safe to generalize some
ends these children might have desired.  As is the ultimate end of most people, I think it is safe to
say  that  the  desired  ends  of  these  children  would  have  included  health  and  happiness,  or
something similar.  Mengele’s end was the acquisition of genetic and medical information in
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order to further his research into Aryan genetics.  “Mengele’s Children”, as their name suggests,
were used solely as a means to Mengele’s  end of furthering genetic knowledge.   There was
neither  informed  consent  nor  any respect  for  these  children  as  intrinsically  valuable  human
beings.  Mengele’s use of these children towards his own ends is a direct violation of the second
formulation of the Categorical Imperative and thus his actions were morally reprehensible.
2.5.1.2. Categorical Imperatives and the Living Will
This section aims specifically to establish whether the concept of a living will is ethically sound,
according to the first and second formulations of Kant’s Categorical Imperative.
The living will is a document which specifies medically related actions to be taken at a stage in a
person’s future when he or she cannot express his or her explicit wishes for medical treatment
independently.  A person generally makes a living will under the premise that the preferences for
medical treatment expressed therein will be carried out and respected at such a time as the living
will takes effect.  Thus implementing requests expressed in the living will, when the time arrives,
is constructed on the maxim that honoring such requests is the best thing to do as this is what the
patient expected upon writing the will.  
The first formulation of the Categorical Imperative states that an action is morally acceptable if
the maxim of that action can be generalized into a universal law, one to which all people will be
subjected.  It is ethical, then, to implement requests in a living will when the time arrives to do
so.  This is because, when such instructions are heeded, doctors are acting on the maxim that
people  make  a  living  will  fully  expecting  it  to  be  respected.   This  maxim  is  easily
universalisable.  No one would write a living will if it were just to be ignored.  Here it is evident
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that carrying out the wishes expressed in a living will is morally permissible according to the
first formulation of the Categorical Imperative.  
As considered in the literature review, the living will is also an instrument used in preserving
patient autonomy upon the event of incapacity.  The living will speaks for the patient, dictating
that patient’s wishes for his or her medical treatment.  The second formulation of the Categorical
Imperative, that people should always be treated as ends in themselves, is easily applicable here:
P1) Within the framework of morality,  the living will expresses autonomous peoples’
individual requests and wishes.
P2) According to the second formulation of Kant’s Categorical imperative, it is morally
right only to treat people as ends in themselves, not merely as a means to some other end.
P3) Treating people as  ‘ends in themselves’  implies,  inter alia,  complying with their
requests and wishes as long as they are within the framework of morality.
C) Therefore acting on requests stated in the living will, and complying with people’s
wishes within the framework of morality,  is ethically correct  according to the second
formulation of the Categorical Imperative.
This analysis of the living will shows that the concept meets ethical tests in two important areas.
Firstly the application of the first formulation to the concept shows that the maxim upon which a
living will is made, and upon which it is carried out, is universalisable.  Secondly, application of
the second formulation shows that the living will is morally defensible as it treats people as ends
in themselves, respecting their intrinsic dignity and worth.
2.5.1.3. Categorical Imperatives and the Living Will: Objections
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Certain  objections  to  my  conclusion  that  the  living  will  is  an  ethically  acceptable  concept
according to Kant’s Categorical Imperative could be voiced.  I shall explore only one of them
here7.  
For the sake of simplicity, I am going to use the example of a hypothetical person called Erica.
Erica made a detailed, unambiguous living will when she was first diagnosed with Huntington’s
chorea.   Fully  aware  that  this  disease  would  render  her  unable  to  communicate  coherent
treatment preferences as she neared death, Erica made the decision to let her living will speak for
her.
In Section 2.2.3.3, Tonelli (1996) noted that the competent person who made a living will was
not the same person as the incompetent person he or she has now become.  He used an example
of  a  brilliant  mathematician.   This  suggests,  in  the  present  example,  that  the  ends  of  the
previously competent Erica have changed upon her lapse into incompetence.  The living will
made  by  the  previously  competent  Erica  has  been  voided  by  dint  of  her  transition  into
incompetence.  As two different people, it is likely that Erica has two different ‘sets’ of ends:  A
‘set’ for the previously competent Erica which was expressed in her living will; and a second
‘set’ for the now incompetent Erica who, although she has this new ‘set’ of ends, cannot express
them because she is incompetent and thus will not be taken seriously for any number of reasons.
It is evident that this objection results in a “Catch 22” situation for Erica and anyone else who
has made a living will whilst still competent.  It is like saying: “Sorry Erica, but whatever you
said before, we’ll ignore.  Rather, we will do what we think is best for you.”  This is clearly
treating Erica as a means, certainly not as an end in herself.  For those who, for whatever reason,
7 This is, in my opinion, one of the most frequently voiced and inhumane objections to the living will.  I have chosen
to discuss it in detail here rather than briefly considering the whole range of objections to my argument.  
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consider the living will to be integral to their future medical treatment this Catch 22 could be a
frightening and intimidating moral problem – the last thing which one who is already seriously
considering the circumstances of his or her death wishes to deal with.  
The “Catch 22”8 revolves around two ‘facts’:
1. The previously competent Erica’s living will is not going to be taken seriously as the
previously competent Erica is now incompetent (and therefore a totally different person
to the previously competent Erica who made the living will!)
2. By virtue of this incompetence, Erica will still not be taken seriously at present.  (This is
because  no  one  would  seriously  consider  an  incompetent  person’s  expression  of
treatment preferences given that they are obviously incapable of making such decisions.)
Therefore, in short, if this objection is to hold any water, we would all have to agree that Erica’s
express wishes for treatment, as an incompetent, ought never to be taken seriously.  Whether she
was competent or incompetent when she expressed the wishes does not matter.  This is because,
according to this objection, previously competent Erica is not the same person who made the
living will now that she is incompetent.  This incompetent Erica is a different person.  In fact, I
would be justified in changing her name at this stage – lets call her Mary.  The fact that Mary is
incompetent means that she is in no mental state to express her wishes.  After all, incompetent
people are incapable of making rational decisions. 
It is evident here that this objection, when really unpacked, verges on the ridiculous.  It seems to
be suggesting that Erica / Mary’s  wishes for treatment should be disregarded whether she is
8 The original “Catch 22” appeared in Joseph Heller’s novel of the same name.  An air force pilot, who wishes to be
taken off active duty, is obviously sane by virtue of this wish, and hence must continue.  By the time he becomes
insane, the wish has disappeared and his flights of duty therefore continue (Heller 1961).
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competent  or incompetent.   Erica’s  wishes  regarding the treatment  of  Mary cannot  be taken
seriously as the competent Erica, and Mary for whom she is making the directive, are not the
same person.  Mary cannot be taken seriously in the expression of her wishes as she should not
be treated as a person at all and certainly not as an end.  Because she is incompetent, Mary
should be made to relinquish all control of her care as she has no idea what is good for her
anyway.
In conclusion, advocates of this objection, like Tonelli (1996), run the risk of being seen as over-
paternalistic and controlling.   People like Erica  /  Mary are categorized into a  medical  ‘box’
which defines who they are and how they ought to be treated.  They ought not to be treated
according to their express wishes, they ought not to be treated as ends in themselves.  It seems
then that the only option is to leave it to chance.  Those who have made a living will should hope
that the doctor in charge of their compassionate care will consider the terms of their living will.
The upshot of this objection is simple: No Living Wills!
There may yet be some hope for these hopeless cases, however.  Ethical doctors are likely to
remember that any maxim for action must be generalized as a universal law.  I have shown that
this is no trouble when it comes to living wills and that they are morally justifiable in this sense.
Most doctors are also moral in this sense.  
2.5.2. Is the Living Will Ethically Acceptable? – Utilitarianism
2.5.2.1. Introduction
Utilitarianism was developed principally by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill in the late 18th
and early 19th century (Pence 2008: 164).  It came about as a response to puritanical Christian
ethics which advocated that everyone obey the rules of Christianity (ibid).
35
The essential idea of Utilitarianism is a simple one: “Right acts produce the greatest amount of
good for the greatest number of beings” (ibid).  This ‘good’ is called ‘utility’ (ibid).  This means
that actions should be judged according to their consequences, not the motives and intentions for
doing them.  If an action benefits more people than those it harms then the action is acceptable
from a Utilitarian point of view.
When it comes to medicine, a good example of Utilitarianism in practice can be gleaned from
Pernkopf’s Topographical Anatomy of the Human Being.  This book has become a “classic of
anatomical literature” and it is valued for its detailed illustrations (Knapp Van Bogaert  2008:
Handout).  It  is possible, however, that the bodies of some Second World War concentration
camp victims were used as models for the illustrations.   
From a Utilitarian point of view, these actions against the prisoners of war can be found morally
acceptable.  This is because only a small number of people suffered harm in the compilation of
the anatomy textbook.9  On the other hand the publication of the book has benefitted many and in
some cases, continues to do so.  It has benefitted medical students and doctors who, in turn, have
used knowledge gained from the book to benefit their patients.  
So the final tally is that many more people have benefitted from the actions taken by Pernkopf
and his team than the small number of Jews who were harmed in the compilation of the book.  In
Utilitarianism the consequences  of  an  action are of  import.   The action itself,  and whatever
morally reprehensible activities it involves, can be morally justified if benefits outweigh harm.
9 Even though about six million Jews lost their lives in the Second World War, only a tiny fraction of this number
were killed and then used as anatomical, cadaverous models for the textbook.
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This  is  the  case  with  Pernkopf’s  book.   According  to  Utilitarianism,  then,  this  book  is  not
ethically suspect.10
2.5.2.2. Utilitarianism and the Living Will
This section aims to establish whether the concept of a living will is an ethically justifiable one
according to Utilitarianism.  Unlike the Kantian analysis presented above, Utilitarian analysis is
not as ‘cut-and-dried’.
For the purpose of argument, here I assume that Sando has made a living will, and that there is
no question that his wishes stated therein will be respected.  Sando will die in the manner he has
specified and with the dignity he desires.  The action of writing the living will has, then, most
certainly benefitted Sando.  It has given him emotional and physical security in the years of his
life since he wrote the will.  The fact that his death will be acceptable to him could be considered
a posthumous benefit to Sando also.
Sando, however, is just one person.  Needing also to be taken into account here is the fact that
“no man is an island entire unto himself” as John Donne famously wrote (The Oxford Dictionary
of Quotations 1979: 190).   This means that  Sando’s actions and decisions regarding his life
influence the lives of other people.  Although the circumstances of Sando’s death will benefit
Sando, it is possible that the total amount of utility will actually decrease as the result of Sando’s
living will.  Those close to him who are aware of his decision may be distressed and unhappy
about the situation as it becomes known to them.  When the time comes for Sando’s living will
to take effect these people may believe that his death is premature and unnecessary at this time.
10 The Utilitarian stand can be taken a step further here.  If a greater amount of utility is required to render an
action morally acceptable, it would make sense to continue use of Pernkopf’s Topographical Anatomy today.  This
is because, as more people benefit from its teachings, utility increases.  Therefore the action becomes more
morally acceptable with continued use of the book.
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In this example, then, the living will cannot be considered morally justified as there is an overall
decrease in utility.
The reason why many people make living wills, and let  us assume that this  is  also Sando’s
motivation, is that there is, inter alia, a wish not to be a burden.  Sando made his living will not
only to ensure for himself a dignified death, but also to ensure that the physical, emotional and
financial wellbeing of his loved ones was preserved.  
Assume Sando has motor neurone disease which will slowly take its toll on his life.  He will
eventually need full time care.   This will either have to be paid for, representing a drain on
finances; or it will have to be provided by a family member or friend.  This person may well
have to quit their job, losing out on the possibility of a steady income and secure retirement.  
These factors  may cause the caretaker  great  emotional,  as well  as financial,  strain.   Sando’s
family members may well be emotionally pained by his slow and painful deterioration.  There
may  also  be  a  certain  amount  of  materialistic  bitterness  as  Sando’s  medical  care  uses  up
resources which would have formed part of an inheritance.  
Seen from this point of view, Sando’s living will, effectively shortening the length of his illness,
seems to provide an overall increase in utility.  Sando will get the dignified death he desires,
freeing him from unbearable suffering.  Family resources will be preserved and Sando’s death
will not be greeted with bitterness.  Here, there is only an increase in overall utility and thus
Sando’s living will can be considered morally justified from a Utilitarian point of view.
This analysis of the living will has shown that Utilitarianism does not shed much light on the
ethics of the living will.  This is dependent upon the stance which one takes and assumptions
made concerning the reactions of affected individuals.  From a narrow, even selfish, point of
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view,  utility could be said to  decrease  and therefore  the concept  to be unjustified.   From a
broader point of view, where the utility of all those effected is considered, according not only to
their emotional  wellbeing but also physical  and financial  utility,  the concept seems ethically
sound.  The main point to be drawn from this ethical  analysis is that Utilitarianism does not
provide a definitive answer regarding the ethical status of the living will.
2.5.2.3. Utilitarianism: An Objection
The first section of my ethical analysis according to Utilitarianism dealt with the fact that the
living will may be unethical as it may take an unnecessary emotional toll on Sando’s loved ones.
This would decrease their utility more than Sando’s would increase as a result of his a living
will.
One objection to this claim is that there would be a certain amount of emotional trauma whether
Sando made a living will or not.  The time will come when Sando is in great pain.  Seeing him in
such pain is likely to be emotionally harrowing for his loved ones.  Eventually Sando will die
and, as with all death, there will be a period of emotional hardship and mourning for his loved
ones.  This emotional state would come about whether or not a living will had been made.  Thus,
to say that the living will is unethical as it will force Sando’s loved ones to contemplate his
death, something which would be emotionally challenging, seems incorrect.  Sando’s loved ones
would have to contemplate his death even in the absence of a living will.
Furthermore, the presence of a living will may make dealing with his death easier for Sando’s
loved ones. They will be familiar with his symptoms, with his wishes for treatment and there will
be no ambiguity as to the medical care he would have desired.  So, even though there will still be
emotional difficulties it may be easier to come to terms with these as a result of the living will.
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This limited emotional response may actually lead to an increase in the utility of all concerned,
thus rendering the living will ethically defensible from a Utilitarian point of view.
2.6. Conclusion
In this chapter I have explored the living will.  The literature reviewed has highlighted some of
the pros and cons of the concept and has addressed some of the most frequently voiced concerns.
I have also established two of my specific objectives, namely that A: both doctors and patients
consider the living will an instrument of some importance, and that B: improved doctor-patient
communication could facilitate a more ethically satisfactory living will based on consent which
is as fully informed as possible.  In my ethical analysis I have considered ethical arguments and
prominent  objections  from  a  Kantian  and  Utilitarian  perspective.   I  have  replied  to  these
objections.
Ultimately I  have argued that the living will is ethically sound.  It  is of great  importance to
doctors and patients and if properly implemented and administered, it can be very valuable.  As
the living will is ethical, integrating it into medical practice should be a priority.  It will serve to
strengthen the doctor-patient relationship.  Having established this, I can now move on to the
doctor-patient relationship, which will be the subject of Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3: The Doctor-Patient Relationship
3.1. Introduction
In Chapter 2 I looked at the living will and concluded that the concept embodies accepted ethical
precepts and therefore it should be given sound consideration, as it is deemed important by both
healthcare professionals and patients alike.  In this chapter I will consider the concept of the
doctor-patient relationship in more detail.  I will begin with a literature review, considering the
doctor-patient  relationship  under  the  headings  of  certain  medical  conditions  and  /  or
interventions.  I have chosen to present the first section in this way as the living will pertains to
end-of-life decisions relevant to medical conditions / interventions.  My findings regarding the
living will and the doctor-patient relationship will be synthesized according to some of the same
medical conditions / interventions in Chapter 4.  
Throughout  Section  3.2  I  will  focus  on  specific  objectives  C  and  D.   Objective  C  entails
evaluating the perceived importance of the doctor-patient relationship according to patients and
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medical  personnel.   Objective  D  involves  identifying  some  barriers  towards  end-of-life
discussions and addressing the unwillingness to talk about death.  In Section 3.3 I will briefly
summarize my findings regarding these two objectives.
Finally,  I  will  present  an  ethical  analysis  of  the  concept  of  the  doctor-patient  relationship,
arguing that it is furthered particularly by good doctor-patient communication.  I will conclude
that good doctor-patient relationships advance the ends of ethical medical practice and thus they
should be encouraged.
3.2. The Doctor-Patient Relationship, Medical Conditions and Interventions
3.2.1. Introduction
For the purposes of this Chapter (and Chapter 4) the doctor-patient relationship can be defined as
follows:  A bond between doctor and patient which is strengthened by good communication and
growing trust over a period of time.  The relationship between a doctor and his or her patient can
have beneficial treatment outcomes and, for the purposes of this research, can help that doctor
understand and implement his or her patient’s wishes.
Mun Chan (2004: 98) claims that “the dying process should be regarded as a sharing process, the
last  journey  that  the  patient  makes  together  with  [his  or]  her  significant  others.”   These
significant  others  include,  most  importantly,  the  patient’s  family and  his  or  her  doctor.  The
reason why these significant  others  should be kept aware  of  the patient’s  end-of-life wishes
includes the idea that the patient is almost always a “connected / pluralistic” being (ibid: 95).  As
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such, the patient is defined according to relationships with others (ibid).  As Aristotle asserts, we
are social animals (McKeon 2001).    
In  order  that  those  closely  connected  to  the  patient  are  able  to  contribute  to  this  kind  of
‘emotional journey’, it is imperative that they are kept informed of the patient’s health status and
prognosis.   This  is  best  achieved  through  good  communication  between  all  parties,  thus
strengthening relationships.  
This communication should have the patient as the primary focus in order to preserve informed
consent and autonomy.  Epstein et. al. (2005: 415 – 416) note that the benefits of good patient-
centered communication include the following:
• The  patient  feels  understood  upon  inquiry  into  his  or  her  needs,  perspectives  and
expectations of quality of life and care.
• Attending to the psychosocial needs of the patient by involving family and loved ones
gives the patient a feeling of security and belonging.
• One should encourage the patient’s involvement in his illness by allowing him to make
decisions about his health and the course of treatment to be followed.  If this is done in
conjunction with familiarizing the patient with the nature of his illness he will feel more
in control of his circumstances.
Moreover Epstein et. al. (ibid: 416) note the if this type of communication is taken slowly, and
with care on the part  of  the doctor,  the patient  will  generally feel  more confident  about  the
doctor’s abilities; and be more trusting of the doctor.
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Given the beneficial consequences of a strong doctor-patent relationship, it is surprising that it is
still neglected in some situations.  Studies reveal that when it comes to joint decision making
involving patient, family and doctor, communication is “inadequate” (Simonds 2003: 274 – 275).
This lack of communication means that patients often do not receive the benefits detailed above.
A study by Pandhi and Saultz (2006: 394) found that interpersonal “continuity of care” enhanced
the doctor-patient relationship.  Interpersonal continuity of care is the idea that a patient is treated
by the same doctor for a lengthy period of time  This is because patients noted that, over time,
doctors  became  more empathetic  to  their  concerns.   The  patients  also gained  confidence  to
“express their needs” to their doctor (ibid).  This review found that patients who experienced
good continuity of care valued “active participation” with their doctor when it came to treatment
discussions and decisions (ibid: 395).  This active communication was valued especially highly
by vulnerable groups such as the elderly, poor, undereducated and those with chronic conditions
(ibid).  
Pandhi and Saultz’s study deals specifically with the elderly and those with chronic conditions,
and  it  helps  to  determine  whether  the  doctor-patient  relationship  is  important  to  patients.
Relating to specific objective C, this study suggests an affirmative answer to the question.
The notion that, as a pluralistic entity, it would be beneficial for a patient to make end-of-life
decisions  in  conjunction  with  family  and  doctor,  implies  that  family  might  be  involved  in
sensitive discussions with the patient and his or her doctor.  According to a study by Shields et.
al.  (2005:344) family members may be encouraged to accompany the patient to doctor visits,
physical tests and examinations.  A concern which is frequently voiced regarding accompanied
visits to the doctor is that the presence of a family member or friend at the consultation may
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detract the doctor’s attention from the patient.  Thus the patient’s concerns are unlikely to be
thoroughly discussed and addressed by the doctor (ibid).  
In their study, which randomly allocated patients to attend visits accompanied or unaccompanied
and then evaluated the quality of those consultation, Shields et. al. (ibid) found that the presence
of a family member or friend did not result in less attention being paid to the patient’s anxieties
about, and preferences for, treatment.  The findings of this study suggest that the worry voiced
here is not necessarily of great consequence.  It should not hinder family involvement in the final
chapter of the life of a loved one.
Communication is fluid.  The conversational style and technique required when entering into a
conversation with patients and their families varies greatly given the nature of the illness as well
as the emotional  state of all those involved.  It  is  becoming quite clear,  however,  that  good
communication skills help to build a good doctor-patient relationship.  The remainder of Section
3.2  will  explore  studies  relating  to  the  doctor-patient  relationship  and  relevant  medical
conditions.
3.2.2. Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and the Doctor-Patient Relationship
A millennium study by Schiff  et. al. (2000: 1641) found that 90% of their study participants,
after  the  appropriate  counseling  and  explanation  of  circumstances,  would  refuse
cardiopulmonary resuscitation11 at the end stage of a terminal disease.  This would be achieved
either by means of a direct request from the patient if mentally competent, or by means of a
living will if incompetent or unable to communicate.  
11 Hereafter referred to as CPR
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In a letter to the British Medical Journal, Wilks et. al.  (2002)12 made mention of the fact that,
although talking about death and decisions for treatment may be very difficult, people generally
value the opportunity to discuss  CPR with their  doctor.   The group  suggests  that  “sensitive
preparation and good communication skills are required” and discussions based on these two
often lead to “a beneficial effect on health outcomes” (ibid).  Although discussions regarding
CPR and the refusal thereof are complicated by the fact that no accurate prediction of outcome is
possible,  patients  have  been  found  to  value  the  opportunity  for  expressing their  preferences
regarding CPR in future medical situations.
The conclusions of this study suggest that patients do value a good relationship with their doctor.
This serves to provide support for my conclusions under specific objective C.  
3.2.3. The Elderly and the Doctor-Patient Relationship
In  their  letter  Wilks  et.  al. (ibid)  observed  that  recent  reports  in  the  British  media,  and on
television, suggested that it was cruel to discuss death with old people and that the whole topic of
end-of-life should be avoided as people do not want to contemplate their death.  
The study by Schiff  et. al.  (2000), mentioned above, records the views of some elderly people
regarding  doctor-patient  communication,  a  relationship  with  their  doctor  and  end-of-life
planning.  Contrary to the portrayal of the situation in the media, this study found that many
elderly  people  have  clear  views  on  end-of-life  issues  and  were  forceful  in  their  conviction
regarding medical interventions at the end-of-life (ibid: 1641).  It was found that elderly people
12 Dr Michael Wilks – Chairman of the Medical Ethics Committee, British Medical Association, Mr Gordon Lishman –
Director General, Age Concern England, Dr Bob Bingham – Chairman, Resuscitation Committee (UK) and Dr Beverly
Malone – General Secretary, Royal College of Nursing.
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wished that their views be known and were keen to discuss treatment plans with their doctors
(ibid).  
Schiff  et. al.’s empirical research, entitled  Views of Elderly People on Living Wills: Interview
Study, supplements findings regarding specific objectives C and D.  It appears that doctor-patient
communication is important to the elderly and that it should be entered into on a regular basis.
This study suggests that doctors should not consider the age of a patient as a barrier to talking
about death.  Elderly people value the opportunity to discuss treatment with their doctor and it is
clear that age should not be considered a barrier to good doctor-patient communication.  This
would lead to an improved doctor-patient relationship.
3.2.4. Mechanical Ventilation and the Doctor-Patient Relationship
Simonds (2003) studied the impact of different forms of ventilation as they pertain to patients
suffering with severe chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (ibid: 272).13  This research notes
that eventually,  all  those with this disease who express a wish for aggressive treatment,  will
progress  to  intubation  and  intermittent  positive  pressure  ventilation  (ibid:  273).14  This  is
considered one of the most aggressive forms of respiratory treatment and a 59% mortality rate is
reported in the year following commencement of IPPV (ibid).  
13 Hereafter referred to as COPD
14 Hereafter referred to as IPPV
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In a study by Pochard et. al. it was found that of a group of patients receiving IPPV, 88% were
depressed, 58% felt unable to communicate, 37% experienced an acute fear of dying, 30% felt
intolerable pain and 21% feared they had been abandoned (Simonds: ibid).  It was also found
that,  following  admission  to  ICU  and  IPPV  treatment,  59%  of  survivors  had  a  greater
dependence on carers, worse exercise tolerance and a poorer quality of life (ibid).  
Given this prognosis, it is not surprising that those with COPD express a desire to communicate
with their doctor concerning the final stage of the disease, hospitalization and ventilation (ibid:
274).  Many consider the prognosis with IPPV and the ensuing quality of life to be unacceptable,
and they express a wish for palliative care at the end stage of the disease rather than invasive and
painful ventilator treatment (ibid).  
It  becomes  obvious  that  the  doctor-patient  relationship,  and  the  close,  interpersonal
communication that comes with it, is very important in such circumstances.  The patient must be
made fully aware of the prognosis and consequences of IPPV and the doctor must also be aware
of his or her patients’ wishes regarding such treatment.  Simonds (ibid: 274 - 275) notes that in
spite  of  its  beneficial  consequences,  doctor-patient  communication  regarding  end  stage  lung
disease is still lacking.  It  is noted that patients are not often familiarized with the burdens of
aggressive treatment, despite guidelines and research evidence that this information does affect
treatment decisions (ibid).  
This section has very specifically detailed the poor prognoses of patients receiving IPPV.  Hence
discussions  with  medical  personnel  are  very  important  as  they  help  patients  make  better
decisions regarding mechanical ventilation.  This observation is relevant to specific objective C.
Regarding specific objective D, it is noted that a clear barrier to communication in this instance
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is the fact that whilst they are ventilated patients cannot talk.  In order to promote an effective
doctor-patient  relationship,  a  doctor  may  be  required  to  develop  creative  new  methods  of
communicating with the patient whilst he or she is ventilated.
3.2.5. Dementia and the Doctor-Patient Relationship
Dementia represents one of the biggest challenges to the doctor-patient relationship.   
In his article entitled Advance Care Planning and the Relevance of a Palliative Care Approach
in  Dementia,  Hertogh  (2006:  534)  notes  that  family  members  of  institutionalized  dementia
patients often experience a lack of important information.  This concerns not only information
relating to specific treatment decisions, but also that regarding the course of the disease (ibid).
The progression from mild to moderate and then severe dementia is not easily defined.  Often
treatment of the condition depends more on intuition than evident pathology.  This complication
in discerning the stages of dementia, coupled with lack of information from doctors, makes it
very difficult for family members to predict the prognosis for a loved one (ibid).  
According to Hertogh (ibid: 555) the Netherlands is often considered to offer some of the most
superior  dementia palliative care  in the world.   This care  has  been integrated  into  dementia
nursing homes, necessitating fewer hospitalizations of dementia patients.  A study by The et. al.
evaluated  the  decision  making  process  regarding  the  course  of  treatment  for  patients  with
dementia in the Netherlands (2002).  
The et. al. (ibid: 1326) found that in order to best understand the wishes of the patient, doctors
created as broad a basis for communication and decision making as possible.  This was achieved
for the most part by involving the family and initiating discussions with all parties involved at
different stages of the disease (ibid: 1328).  What this treatment plan entailed was the building of
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a relationship between doctor, patient and family members concerned.  At some point, however,
the responsibility of decision making fell primarily to a familial proxy as the demented patient
lapsed into incompetence.  
Multidisciplinary teams of healthcare professionals in the study reviewed the situation of each
patient in the nursing home at six month intervals.  Following an evaluation of prognosis and
efficacy of present treatment, family members and proxies were invited to discuss the next six
months of treatment with the doctor and the patient,  depending on patient competence (ibid:
1328).  At these meetings, treatment decisions were made based on:
• the medical condition of the patient;
•  the wishes of the family;
•  interpretations of the patient’s quality of life, and
•  any previous wishes of the patient (ibid: 1326).  
It  is  obvious  from this  study that  a good  doctor-patient  relationship is  very important  when
dealing with treatment for a progressive disease like dementia.  The results of programmes in
which  good  communication  is  emphasized  are  notable:  family  members  feel  relieved  upon
receiving information which helps them decide about the future of a loved one.  In addition, as
Hertogh (2006: 555) notes, healthcare workers feel encouraged to address the subject of advance
care planning with patients and proxies.  
The wishes of the patient, as previously articulated to family and doctor, are important.  The
same is true of the opinions of family and proxies, who have close personal knowledge of the
patient.  For a doctor to offer a dementia patient the most favorable, personally acceptable care, it
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is important that the doctor has as much information about the patient as possible.  As shown in
this section, this is generally obtained as a result of a good doctor-patient relationship.
The fact that the Dutch medical personnel mentioned in this section take a great deal of care to
communicate  adequately  with  their  patients  suggests  that  the  doctor-patient  relationship  is
important  to  medical  personnel  in  the  Netherlands;  furthering  findings  related  to  specific
objective C.  Unfortunately this cannot be generalized to other countries, but it provides a fair
indication of  the attitudes of some medical  personnel.   In  this case,  medical  personnel  have
recognized the need for good care and communication; and they have responded to it.
3.2.6. Tube Feeding and the Doctor-Patient Relationship
In  their  study,  The  et.  al.  (2002) aimed  to  determine  the  decision  making  process  behind
withholding the artificial administration of food and fluids in incompetent patients.  Some of
their  results  have  been  considered  in  Section  3.2.5  regarding  treatment  for  patients  with
dementia.  In these cases the patient’s family was warned at the outset that the time would come
when a decision regarding artificial feeding would be necessary.   When it comes to dementia
patients, this decision was generally made by the familial proxy in conjunction with the attending
doctor (ibid: 1237).  An example noted by the authors (ibid: 1239) provides an illustration of this
method of decision making in action.  
Mrs. J is a patient with moderate to severe dementia.  In a conversation with her doctor, Mrs. J’s
daughter,  Prudence,  notes that Mrs.  J’s condition has been getting steadily worse.   Prudence
states that her mother “hasn’t recognized [her] for some time now.”  The doctor adds that the
nursing staff have noticed that Mrs. J is having great trouble swallowing.  This is confirmed by
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Prudence who comments on her mother’s weight loss and her apparent inability to swallow the
sweets “she loves so much.”  
The doctor reminds Prudence that although they are currently mincing up all Mrs. J’s meals as
well as giving her extra protein, the time will come when she will need to be fed artificially
through a tube.  Prudence answers: “No.  My mother would never have wanted that.  She always
said that she didn’t want to be kept alive.  No, no tubes.”  Mrs. J’s doctor agrees, noting that the
dementia  has  now progressed  to  the  stage  that  tube  feeding  would  only  be  prolonging  the
inevitable.  It is agreed to place Mrs. J onto a palliative care regimen, giving her all nutrition she
can take orally as well as controlling any pain she appears to experience.  
In this situation conversation between doctor and proxy reveals certain preferences on the part of
the patient.  The doctor is unlikely to find out about such preferences in the absence of contact
with family members and proxy decision makers.  The decision not to tube feed here is based on
Prudence’s conviction that her mother would not have wished to receive artificially administered
nutrition.  Prudence’s guidance,  and the fact  that Mrs. J’s doctor took the time to enter into
conversation with her, will help ensure that Mrs. J receives treatment which is in accordance
with previously expressed wishes.
Specific  objective  C has  been  addressed  above.   It  shows that  ongoing  communication  and
relationship with the relevant proxy, given the incompetence of the patient, is something that the
doctors participating in The et. al’s study held in high esteem.  Through this relationship, patients
and their families receive the benefit of detailed information and participatory decision making
which adds to a sense of security regarding treatment and enhances trust in the doctor.
3.2.7. Intensive Care and the Doctor-Patient Relationship
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 In their 2002 study, Way et. al. examine empirical research concerning the process of decision
making in  Intensive  Care Units.15  They focus  especially  on the decision making process  a
propos the withholding or withdrawing life support (ibid: 1342).  
It is noted that families of critically ill patients in ICU often rate communication with doctors as
among their most important and urgent concerns.  This is often considered more important than
clinical skills (ibid: 1345).  Families felt reassured, and experienced greater peace of mind, when
they  felt  that  questions  put  to  the  doctor  were  answered  honestly  and  articulated  in  an
understandable  fashion,  pitched  at  the  level  of  the  family  rather  than  that  of  other  medical
professionals (ibid).  
In a literature search, the authors found that empirical research had shown that doctors have a
poor understanding of patient preferences.  Patients were also unlikely to discuss preferences for
ICU treatment with their doctors (ibid: 1342).  Another study showed that doctor’s predictions of
patient treatment preferences were only mildly better than chance (ibid).  It was also found that
some  doctors  make  inaccurate  assumptions  regarding  treatment  preferences  according  to  a
patient’s age or quality of life (ibid).  
Over and above inaccurate predictions for care on the part of doctors, it was found that there was
a  good  deal  of  disagreement  regarding  treatment  between  concerned  parties.   One study of
patients  for  whom withdrawal  of  life  support  was  being  considered  revealed  the  following
conflicts: staff and family had conflicting opinions in 48% of cases, staff members conflicted
with each other in 48% of cases and family conflicted with each other 24% of the time (ibid:
1343).
15 Hereafter referred to as ICU(s)
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Further  complicating  treatment  decisions  in  ICU was  the  apparently  stunted  communication
ability  of some doctors  (ibid:  1345).   A study evaluating doctor-family meetings  found that
families did not understand basic features of the diagnosis, prognosis or treatment 54% of the
time (ibid).   Furthermore,  research  regarding  resuscitation  discussions  found that  the  doctor
talked 75% of the time, thus missing important opportunities to allow patients and families to
voice their opinions or discuss goals for treatment (ibid).
Given the fact that some ICU doctors are both unfamiliar with patient’s treatment preferences
and are unable to communicate adequately, as well as the conflict which arises when it comes to
proxy decision making, it has been found that the best way to resolve conflicts is to build on
communication, negotiation and consensus building (ibid).  The way to resolve conflicts is to
build a relationship.  An example of this process of decision making as it is used in ICU can be
found in Appendix 1.  This model necessitates that the ICU doctor spend time with the family
and healthcare team in order to discern the most appropriate course of treatment for the patient.
This section has dealt with the idea of doctors trying to ascertain the treatment preferences of
their patients.  Their decisions may be considered a barrier to communication between patients
and doctors – specific objective D.  This is because doctors believe their decisions are accurate,
thus somewhat obviating the need for communication.  Here it has been shown that doctor’s
decisions are not always accurate.  This means that actual communication could be helpful.
3.2.8. Schizophrenia, Mental Disorders and the Doctor-Patient Relationship
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In a news article for the British Medical Journal, Mayor (2002: 1317) summarizes the position of
the  National  Institute  for  Clinical  Excellence16 regarding  treatment  decisions  for  people
committed into mental institutions or with mental disorders like schizophrenia.  
NICE recommends  that  people  with  mental  disorders  should  be  involved  in  all  discussions
regarding their treatment plan and healthcare.  It also advises that such patients are offered not
only regular drug therapy but also psychological treatment (ibid).  NICE advocates that “health
professionals should work in partnership with services users and carers” and that they should
offer help, treatment and appropriate care in an atmosphere of “hope and optimism” (ibid).  
There is an emphasis on the need for proper joint decision making and informed consent in all
forms  of  schizophrenia  care  (ibid).   It  was  recommended  that  informed  consent  and  joint
decision making would best be achieved if the patient was in a more proactive mental state.
Thus  the  recommendation  was that  psychotic  patients  were  only moderately  medicated  with
antipsychotic drugs rather than the high doses, favored in the past, which often led to lethargy
and unassertiveness (ibid).
Although relationships with schizophrenia patients may be challenging, they are not overly so.  It
is important to remember that these patients may also desire some say in their treatment plan.  It
is easy in theory to allow this as it is generally quite obvious whether a patient is in a manic or
normal phase.   Treatment  decisions  for  manic  phases can  be discussed  and recorded  during
normal phases.  Here it is once again very important for the healthcare team to spend time with
the patient and ensure that treatment plans are agreeable to all parties.
16 Hereafter referred to as NICE
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Given that schizophrenia sufferers fluctuate between manic and normal phases it is important
and relevant that they have a say in their treatment whilst in a normal phase; and that their wishes
are respected, especially when in a manic phase.  The study presented here suggests that a good
relationship with psychiatrists and other healthcare professionals is valued by patients with this
kind of mental disorder, especially when in a stage of relative normality.  These results relate to
specific objective C.
3.2.9. Diagnostic Testing and Results; and the Doctor-Patient Relationship
In their study entitled Patient-Centered Communication and Diagnostic Testing, Epstein et. al.
(2005: 415) concluded that better communication between doctors and patients was associated
with fewer diagnostic tests and decreased expenditures, but also with increased visit length.
This study was undertaken because of concerns that patient-centered medicine might lead to an
increase in healthcare costs (ibid: 416).  Other concerns were that spending more time with each
patient decreased the number of patients who could be attended to on a daily basis.
Patient-centered communication can be of great benefit to the patient in cutting costs of testing
and it helps the patient build a relationship with his or her doctor, increasing the probability of
future treatment decisions being in line with patient preferences.
When it comes to specific objectives C and D, it becomes evident that over-zealous testing on
the part of the doctor may hinder, rather than help, communication.  Thus, it could be seen as a
barrier.  This could be as the result of a feeling that if there are going to be tests, communication
is unnecessary.   Clearly communication which leads to fewer diagnostic testing procedures is
beneficial to the patient in a physical, mental and material sense.17  
17 The physical benefit is fewer painful or invasive tests.  The mental benefit regards peace-of-mind.  Patients find
the waiting period for test results nerve-wracking and sometimes traumatic.  The material benefit regards
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3.2.10. HIV / AIDS and the Doctor-Patient Relationship
AIDS patients will also have to consider end-of-life care, generally as a result of an AIDS related
illness.
A study by Curtis and Patrick (1997) explored barriers to, and facilitators of, communication
regarding end-of-life treatment for AIDS patients.  The AIDS patients voiced concerns common
to those noted by patients with other diseases, such as discomfort when it came to talking about
death and dying (ibid: 736).  Two barriers unique to communication with AIDS patients were
found:
• Some AIDS patients felt  that talking about death may cause harm or even hasten the
dying process (ibid).  This was because many patients felt that their HIV was some form
of  punishment  from  God  for  being  promiscuous  or  experimental  with  IV  narcotics.
Imminent death was to be borne in a stoical manner and should not be bought out into the
open (ibid: 739).  
• Many AIDS patients had experienced previous discrimination in the healthcare system
based on their HIV positive status (ibid: 736).  They were now unwilling to discuss their
HIV status, and preferences for treatment, as there was a fear of further discrimination
(ibid).
The conclusion of this study was that in order to improve quality of care at the end of life, it was
also necessary to improve quality of the doctor-patient relationship at the end of life (ibid).  It
was found that a good relationship, based on thorough communication, went hand-in-hand with
finances.  The financial benefit of fewer diagnostic tests means that doctor-patient communication may be
especially valued by those in lower income groups.  It is surprising that it is not initiated as a norm in state-funded
practice as it appears good doctor-patent communication may prevent wanton waste of tax resources.
57
good end-of-life  care.   Hence it  was important  for  HIV doctors  to overcome the barriers  to
communication  identified  in  the  study  (ibid).   Because  AIDS  is  stigmatized,  doctor-patient
communication can become very difficult and it must be handled with great sensitivity.
Curtis and Patrick’s study deals specifically with barriers to, and facilitators of, doctor-patient
communication amongst AIDS patients.  Hence it is of most relevance to specific objective D.
The fact  that  AIDS patients fear stigmatization and discrimination suggests that, though they
would value communication opportunities – specific objective C - they fear the consequences of
being open with doctors regarding HIV positive status.
3.3. Specific Objectives C and D
In this section I will very briefly summarize my findings regarding specific objectives C and D: 
C. To  evaluate  the  perceived  importance  of  the  doctor-patient  relationship  according  to
patients and medical personnel.
D. To discuss some barriers towards end-of-life discussions, and the unwillingness, on the
part of both doctors and patients, to talk about death.
3.3.1.  Specific  Objective  C:  Evaluating  the  Perceived  Importance  of  the  Doctor-Patient
Relationship According to Patients and Medical Personnel
In Section 3.2 I have shown that doctor-patient discussions are considered important to patients
and to doctors.
Literature on the benefits of a good doctor-patient relationship from the patient’s point of view
has been considered.  These benefits can be summed up as a more positive attitude on the part of
patients  regarding  their  disease  and  its  treatment.   Good  communication  leads  to  growing
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confidence and trust in the doctor.  I have also examined the negative consequences of a poor
doctor-patient relationship from the patient’s perspective, especially in Sections 3.2.4, 3.2.7 and
3.2.8.  All studies and articles considered in Section 3.2 suggested that a good relationship with
the doctor was of great importance to patients and should be prioritized.
The  conclusion  that  a  good  doctor-patient  relationship  is  also  considered  important  from a
doctor’s perspective is more implicit in this literature.   Studies regarding dementia and tube-
feeding focus on the communicative strengths of the doctors concerned.  These doctors have
identified their relationships with patients as a necessary component of treatment.   It  can be
inferred that these doctors believe that the benefits  accruing to patients as a result of a good
relationship between patient and doctor are important.  
Although it cannot be claimed that all patients value the benefits of a solid relationship with their
doctor, or that all doctors consider this to be important, the literature review has shown that it is
symbiotically beneficial in a majority of cases.  A patient benefits from open communication
with his or her doctor and the doctor in question similarly benefits from a high level of patient
satisfaction and esteem.
3.3.2. Specific Objective D: Identifying some Barriers Towards End-of–Life Discussions and the
Unwillingness to Talk About Death
Throughout Section 3.2 many barriers to communication regarding end-of-life discussions were
identified:
• When it comes to the elderly, a perception that older people - ipso facto closer to death –
wished to avoid the subject was considered the most common barrier to communication.
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Another barrier was the fact that there is a general  unwillingness to talk about death,
although this barrier does not effect communication with elderly people only.  
• Physical  barriers  to  communication  were  identified  and  it  was  suggested  that  more
innovative communication styles were required to overcome these.  
• Doctors’ confidence in their own assessments for patient care was also cited as a barrier
to good communication, given the fact that these were often incorrect.  
• AIDS patients expressed unique barriers to communication relating to superstition and
fear of discrimination.
It is evident here that there are several barriers to communication.  There may be many others
that have not been identified in this study.  What becomes clear is that in order for patients to
receive  the benefits  of  good doctor-patient  communication,  and hence  a good  doctor-patient
relationship, these barriers must be overcome by conscious effort on the part practitioners.
3.4. Ethical Analysis
I have considered the doctor-patient relationship in Section 3.2 of this chapter, and concluded
that:
• The notion is considered important to both patients and medical personnel alike; and
• There  are numerous barriers  preventing the proper  implementation of communication
between doctors and patients.
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I will now consider whether  or not a good doctor-patient relationship enhances the ethics of
medical practice and whether the process as a whole is ethically justifiable. The ethical analysis
of the doctor-patient relationship will be in accordance with the theory of Principlism.
3.4.1. Is the Doctor-Patient Relationship Ethical? – Principlism
3.4.1.1. Introduction
Principlism was developed by Americans Tom Beauchamp and James Childress in the 1970s
(Carter 2008: 2).  It  has today become a mainstream ethical  theory and is widely applied to
biomedical  dilemmas  (ibid).   Principlism  gives  four  prima  facie obligations:  autonomy,
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice (Mallia 2003: 131).  The relative importance of these
principles is dependent on the moral and ethical  (and other, possible religious) values of the
agent making a decision (ibid).  In medicine the agent is usually a doctor.
3.4.2. Autonomy
3.4.2.1. Introduction
Over the decades, respect for patient autonomy has come to be considered an integral part of the
doctor-patient  relationship (ibid:  2).   Its  recognition has  primarily come about  in reaction to
atrocities of the past.  Most notable of these were the horrendous human rights violations of Nazi
concentration camps during World War Two.  The Nuremberg Code, ratified after the end of the
war, is the documentary culmination of the trials, in Nuremberg, of doctors and scientists who
committed crimes  against  humanity  during the  war  (2007 (b):  696).   The  Nuremberg  Code
enshrines autonomy: “The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential” and
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the medical  subject  (patient)  “should be so situated as  to be able to  exercise  free  power  of
choice” (ibid).  
Autonomy can be defined as “The capacity, right, or actual condition of self-government, or the
determination  of  one’s  own actions”  (Feinberg  and  Shafer-Landau  2002:  776).   In  order  to
exercise  autonomy,  then,  one  must  act  without  outside  influence  in  the  form  of  coercion,
manipulation and duress.   In  order  to act  in  this  manner,  one must be familiar  with  all  the
circumstances surrounding a particular decision.  If there is a lack of pertinent information an
action cannot be labeled autonomous.
3.4.2.2. Autonomy and the Doctor-Patient Relationship
In medicine, autonomy is prized very highly.  It is the principle guiding informed consent, which
has become an integral aspect of all medical treatment.  In order to uphold and promote patient
autonomy,  informed  consent  is  a  mandatory  requirement.   Informed  consent  involves
familiarizing the patient with his or her condition, as well as explaining possible treatments in
great detail, including the risks, benefits and social and psychological consequences.  This is best
achieved (possibly only achieved) through good doctor-patient communication, which is brought
about by a good doctor-patient relationship.  
Consider  the  following  example,  adapted  from  Professor  D.  J.  McQuoid-Mason  (2008:
Handout).  Sarel, a high-flying entrepreneur with little interest in anything but profit is suffering
much pain.  In  spite of his work pressures  he consents to simple,  exploratory surgery under
general anesthetic in order to examine a possibly malignant growth in his abdomen.  Sarel can
recover from this simple procedure over the weekend and be back at work on Monday.  During
the procedure,  however,  the growth is  found to be highly malignant.   The surgeon takes the
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decision to excise the tumor along with some of the secondary growths in Sarel’s glands.  Had
the malignant tissue not been removed, Sarel’s life expectancy would have been reduced to one
year.  
As a result of the surgery,  however,  workhorse Sarel must now take three months off.  It  is
estimated that during this time Sarel will lose R1m in profit due to the fact that he will be unable
to  complete a  contract.   Sarel  is  outraged.   He claims  that  had  he  known  his  tumors  were
malignant and he would be requiring major surgery he would have postponed it until the contract
was complete in four months time.
It is quite clear that Sarel’s autonomy was infringed by the surgeon who did not obtain informed
consent for the major tumor excision surgery.  Sarel lost his ability to be self-determining, even
though the surgeon in question may have been acting with Sarel’s best interests at heart.  Had the
surgeon taken more time to communicate with Sarel, and explore all the eventual outcomes of
the exploratory surgery, Sarel would not be in this disadvantaged position and the surgeon would
not potentially be facing a law suit.  
It is evident from this example that a good doctor-patient relationship is vital when it comes to
furthering  patient  autonomy.   This  relationship  entails  communication,  and  communication
means that the patient will be aware of his or her options and that the doctor will not act against
the patient’s wishes.  In order to know those wishes and act on them, thus leaving autonomy
intact, conversation and relationship are paramount.  By the principle of autonomy, then, the
doctor-patient relationship is ethically sound and therefore desirable.
3.4.3. Beneficence
3.4.3.1. Introduction
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According  to  Mallia,  beneficence  comes  about  as  a  result  of  the  doctor-patient  relationship
(Mallia 2003: 2).  A patient generally consults a doctor with the expectation that some good will
ensue  (ibid).   This  may  be  in  the  form  of  physical  relief,  psychological  support  or
encouragement.  Such benefits are referred to as “the good” or “good” in the paragraphs below.  
According  to  Frankena  (cited  in  Van Bogaert  2007 (c):  96)  the  principle  of  beneficence  is
normative.  It says that:
• One ought not to inflict evil or harm
• One ought to prevent evil or harm
• One ought to remove evil
• One ought to do or promote the good of one’s patient. 
3.4.3.2. Beneficence and the Doctor-Patient Relationship
In order to promote beneficence, a good doctor-patient relationship is necessary.  
Returning to the example of Sarel:  A communicative relationship in this case would have served
to prevent harm.  It would have familiarized Sarel’s surgeon with his wishes for treatment.  It is
important to remember, however, that Principlism is a set of prima facie obligations and as such
the principle of beneficence must be weighed against the other principles.
The surgeon may well have infringed Sarel’s autonomy; however he believed that he was doing
good for his patient by removing the tumors.  This is not necessarily the case.  For someone
driven  by  financial  gain,  a  million  rand  contract  may  be  far  more  important  than  physical
wellbeing.   Had the surgeon communicated with Sarel,  he would have been promoting both
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autonomy and beneficence.  Under Sarel’s ranking of the principles, the opportunity to postpone
the surgery was the good, as it would have allowed him to pursue his autonomous objective of
carrying out the contract.
It  is evident here that a good doctor-patient relationship allows for and promotes beneficence.
Without the communication that comes as part of this relationship, a doctor would not be aware
of what his or her patient considers “good” and would then not be able to act in a beneficent
manner towards that patient.
3.4.4. Non-Maleficence
3.4.4.1. Introduction
The principle of non-maleficence is commonly considered to be enshrined in the Hippocratic
Oath (ibid: 97).  It is conventionally thought that this part of The Oath commands us to “Primum
non nocere” – First Do No Harm (ibid).  The Oath does not actually advocate against doing harm
to this absolute extent.  Rather it  advises us, in the words of Gillon, to “abstain from doing
whatever is deleterious and mischievous” (ibid).  In medicine it is important to remember that
sometimes doing harm is necessary in order to do good.
3.4.4.2. Non-Maleficence and the Doctor-Patient Relationship
In the case of Sarel, the surgeon removes malignant tissue, inflicting harm on Sarel’s physical
self as well as his financial self.  The surgeon, however, believed he was doing good.  This is an
example of conflicting prima facie obligations.  The surgeon decided that the benefit accruing to
Sarel as a result of the excision was sufficient to outweigh the harm he would suffer as a result of
the surgery.  This surgeon may have considered his action to be beneficent; however the failure
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of informed consent in this case renders it more paternalistic than beneficent.  So the surgeon
considered beneficence to be his ultimate prima facie obligation in this case.  By acting in the
manner he did, the surgeon infringed the two most important prima facie obligations according
to Sarel, namely autonomy and non-maleficence.  Had the surgeon taken time to communicate
with Sarel, the result here may well have been different.  Both would have had a chance to voice
concerns regarding treatment and a consensual treatment plan could have been devised.
A good relationship with patients will help a doctor gauge the amount of risk a patient is willing
to accept for the benefits of treatment.  Subjecting the patient to more risks than he or she is
willing to take on is doing harm, even if the medical benefits of such actions are substantial.
Thus  it  can  be concluded  that  the doctor-patient  relationship enhances  the  principle of  non-
maleficence as it helps ensure that the patient has a good understanding of the risks and benefits
of different treatments and gives an informed consent on this basis.
3.4.5. Justice
3.4.5.1. Introduction
In the context of healthcare, justice is related to the concept of allocation of scarce resources
(ibid: 98).  It conflicts with the Hippocratic Oath, which advocates that one should do the best
one can for every patient (ibid).  Justice entails that due to resource scarcity, some patients and
conditions may take priority over others.  The big question is, how does one decide who should
benefit from scarce resources?  Is it just to allow an alcoholic to undergo dialysis while at the
same time refusing an innocent child the same treatment?  Who should take priority when it
comes to scarce resources?
3.4.5.2. Justice and the Doctor-Patient Relationship
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The doctor-patient relationship could be seen as a scarce resource.   Developing it  is a time-
consuming  process.   Whilst  a  doctor  is  having  lengthy  discussions  with  one  patient,  other
patients  who  would  benefit  from her  medical  attention  are  losing  out.   There  is  a  tradeoff
between the amount of time a doctor spends building a relationship with her patients and the
number of patients she can attend to.  They are inversely proportional: a stronger relationship,
requiring more communication, implies fewer patients.
Unlike  autonomy,  beneficence  and  non-maleficence,  the  ends  of  justice  are  not  necessarily
furthered by the promotion of a good doctor-patient relationship.  Justice may be better served by
focusing less on individual relationships and attending to a greater number of patients.  Justice
can be viewed from two aspects here and it is for each doctor to decide their relative importance.
1. It  may be  considered  more  just  to  treat  fewer  patients  in  a  thorough  and  thoughtful
manner.  This involves building a relationship with them, thus furthering the principles of
autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence. Or, 
2. it  may be considered more just to treat  a greater number of people at  the expense of
promoting the three other medical principles and the doctor-patient relationship.
Justice, then, does not conclusively advocate for or against the doctor-patient relationship.  
3.4.6. Ethical Analysis - Conclusion
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It is clear from this analysis that a good doctor-patient relationship is ethically relevant according
to  the  principles  of  autonomy,  beneficence  and  non-maleficence;  and  ambivalent  under  the
principle of justice. 
The weighting system by which doctor and patient judge the relative importance of the four
prima facie principles  dictates  the extent  to which the doctor-patient  relationship will  be an
integral part of medical treatment.  The doctor-patient relationship is important to three of the
principles, and not irrelevant to the fourth; the process of relationship building helps further all
the principles to some extent.  It can be concluded that the doctor-patient relationship is morally
desirable according to Principlism.
3.5. Conclusion
In this chapter I have explored the doctor-patient relationship.  Starting with a study of published
literature, I have examined specific objectives C and D.  With regard to these objectives I have
concluded that the doctor-patient relationship is significant to both doctors and patients.  Patients
find  a  relationship  with  their  doctor  particularly  important  should  they  be  suffering  from a
terminal  illness  or  a  mental  disease.   I  have  also  identified  some  barriers  to  doctor-patient
communication and, in Section 3.3.2 suggested that new, innovative communication styles could
help  overcome  these  barriers,  hence  improving  the  doctor-patient  relationship.    An ethical
analysis of the doctor-patient relationship according to the moral theory of Principlism has been
undertaken.
I have concluded that a strong doctor-patient relationship is ethically essential.  As this is the
case  it  follows that  the  doctor-patient  relationship should be,  or  should become,  an  integral
framework for medical consultation and decision making.
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Having now shown that my two primary concepts, namely the living will and the doctor-patient
relationship, are ethically valuable and desirable, I will explain in Chapter 4 how the living will
can enhance doctor-patient communication and the doctor-patient relationship.
Chapter 4: Living, Dying and the Living Will - Enhancing the Doctor-Patient Relationship
4.1 Introduction
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In the previous two chapters, I have explored in depth the two central topics of this research,
namely living wills and the doctor-patient relationship.  I have concluded that each is morally
acceptable  and thus they should both be considered  as  integral  to medical  practice.   In  this
chapter I will synthesize my findings from the previous two chapters.  I will present an argument
in favor of the living will as an instrument for enhancing the doctor-patient relationship.
I will begin by considering literature relating to this question.  I will then consider the idea that
the living will could be used to enhance the doctor-patient relationship based on my findings and
conclusions from the previous two chapters.   A selection of the medical  conditions and /  or
interventions mentioned in Chapter 3 will be used to exemplify ways in which the living will
could enhance the doctor-patient relationship.  Finally,  I will address specific objective E by
suggesting an outline for a practical  model of using the living will as a means of improving
communication and thus enhancing the doctor-patient relationship.  I will make suggestions as to
how the living will could become more widespread and hence discussions more readily initiated.
4.2. Literature Review
4.2.1. Introduction
Few published studies and articles deal with the way in which the living will might help enhance
the doctor-patient relationship.  This section deals with those which I have managed to find.  The
first study to be discussed here is an editorial in the British Medical Journal entitled: How Living
Wills can Help Doctors and Patients Talk about Dying.  The second is an empirical study in Age
and Ageing entitled: Living Wills and the Mental Capacity Act: a Postal Questionnaire Survey of
UK Geriatricians.  These articles emphasize a close inter-connection between the living will and
doctor-patient communication which enhances the doctor-patient relationship.  The third study
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regarding  this  topic  appeared  in  the  Journal  of  General  Internal  Medicine and  was  titled
Barriers to Communication About End-of-Life Care in AIDS Patients.  This study found results
contrary to those reported in the first two studies mentioned above.
4.2.2. How Living Wills can Help Doctors and Patients Talk about Dying
This editorial concerned itself with the link between living wills and the much publicized need
for  better  doctor-patient  communication  regarding  end-of-life  care  (2000:  1640  –  1641).   It
mentioned studies which found that many patients are confused by the notion of a living will, but
would nonetheless welcome the opportunity to discuss end-of-life care (Emanuel 2000: 1640).
As  a  document  specifically  related  to  end-of-life  care,  the  invocation  of  a  living  will  may
facilitate an improvement in the quality and frequency of discussions regarding end-of-life care
and death.  Emanuel (ibid) notes that living wills are generally in the form of “worksheets” or
templates.  These worksheets could be used to help “reflection and deliberation, and for team
building between the professionals, families and the patient.”  
Emanuel (ibid) further emphasizes the importance of communication in her editorial by stating
that some elderly patients welcomed the opportunity to consider, and have some control over, the
last chapter of their life.  Discussion helps to ready proxy decision makers for their roles in
making healthcare decisions on behalf of the patient.  Discussions like this also give families a
chance to talk  about the end-of-life  and to resolve personal  matters.   Emanuel  (ibid) finally
claims that “living wills [have come] to be seen as a vehicle for achieving greater wisdom and
skill in a fundamental aspect of healthcare and a civilized approach to mortality.”
4.2.3.  Living  Wills  and  the  Mental  Capacity  Act:  a  Postal  Questionnaire  Survey  of  UK
Geriatricians 
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This study was conducted amongst geriatrician members of the British Geriatrics Society.  The
reason why geriatricians were chosen as the study group was that they have the greatest exposure
to patients facing end-of-life decisions (Schiff et. al. 2006: 116).  Schiff et. al. (ibid) found that
many of the geriatricians practicing in Britain had experience of the living will.  
Many  stated  that  the  living  will,  in  patients  where  it  had  not  yet  come  into  force,  “aided
discussions about end-of-life care” (ibid: 118).  It was found that, in the case of 96% of patients
and 76% of families, presence of a living will made it easier to broach and discuss the subject of
death (ibid: 117).  In these cases it was also noted that such discussions took place “without
inappropriately increasing time spent with the patient or relatives” (ibid: 118).
This study also showed that, in some cases where a patient’s living will had not been discussed
with  family  and  proxy  decision  makers,  these  parties  misunderstood  its  terms  and  were
unfamiliar  with  its  procedures  (ibid:  117).   It  was  also found  that  proxy decisions  for  care
showed greater agreement with the living will directives of patients in cases where the living will
had been discussed with the patient, the doctor and the proxies themselves (ibid: 119).  This
suggests the importance of discussing end-of-life care as well as the contents of a living will.
4.2.4. Barriers to Communication About End-of-Life Care in AIDS Patients
In this study conducted by Curtis and Patrick (1997), which was mentioned in Chapter 3, the
living will was found to hinder discussions between patients and their doctors (ibid: 736).  This
was because participants in the study believed that once their preferences had been documented
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in a living will, discussion was not necessary: “When you do the papers it pretty well lays it out
there.  It makes it clear.  You’ve written it down.  End of discussion” (ibid: 738 - 739).  
This same study found, however, that when the contents of a living will were discussed with
family and patient, these discussions were considered “less threatening” and more important.
Family members may well be sharing in a patient’s treatment decisions (ibid: 739).  Discussions
regarding the contents of a living will - with a family member present - were also useful in that
they helped iron-out the possible ambiguous interpretations of treatment decisions expressed in
the living will (ibid).
4.3. Case-Based Reasoning and Casuistry
Case-based reasoning entails that each philosophical case presented must be evaluated on its own
merits rather then according to a set of rules.  Decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis.
In each case the benefits and risks must be evaluated and acted upon in a manner fitting the
particulars of the case (Strong 1999: 395).  Case-based reasoning is particularly useful when it
comes  to  the  study of  bioethics  and  medical  ethics.   Medicine  is  a  profession  dealing  with
people, all of whom have specific, and varying, circumstances.  
Case-based  reasoning  allows  for  the consideration  of  personal  circumstances  on their  merits
(ibid: 396).  Casuistry proposes a modus operandi for doing so, by taking the case at hand and
comparing it with one or more  paradigm cases.  These paradigm cases are ones in which it is
quite clear what course of action should be taken (ibid).
4.4. Paradigmatic Cases, the Living Will and the Doctor-Patient Relationship
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In this section I will consider cases in which the living will is introduced as a component of the
medical  consultation process, either by a doctor or by a patient.  I will present four fictional
scenarios, corresponding to some of the medical disorders mentioned in Chapter 3.  In each case
I will show how the living will could hypothetically improve communication and strengthen the
doctor-patient relationship.  I will argue in my conclusion (Section 4.4.5.) that cases such as this
should be considered as paradigmatic and could be very useful for solving bioethical dilemmas
by means of casuistic reasoning.
4.4.1. Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and the Living Will
In 1994, Mandla, father of Tumi, was involved in a serious motor-vehicle accident.  Paramedics
at the scene did everything in their power to resuscitate Mandla and eventually his heart started
beating.  It was clear, however, that Mandla could not breathe.  He was ventilated.  Three years
later, in 1997, Mandla was still on a ventilator.  It had been decided that he had irreversible brain
damage.  As his closest next-of-kin, Tumi became Mandla’s healthcare proxy.  She made the
decision to remove ventilator support in mid-1997 and Mandla died a few minutes later.
Having been witness to her father’s situation, and having noted the emotional toll his accident
and  subsequent  medical  treatment  had  taken  on  her,  Tumi  made a  living  will  in  late-1997.
Before  she signed  the living will  she took it  to her  general  practitioner,  Dr.  Mallone.    Dr.
Mallone had also treated Tumi’s father and paid close attention to his medical condition after the
accident.   Tumi decided that talking to Dr. Mallone was necessary as it was recommended on
the living will document.  In her living will Tumi explicitly refuses CPR under circumstances
where there is little or no hope of making a full recovery.
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Now, in 2008, Tumi receives an annual phone call from Dr. Mallone.  He invites her to meet him
on a yearly basis to discuss her living will.  During these discussions, Dr. Mallone informs Tumi
of new medical treatments which she might like to consider.  He also gauges changes in her
attitude to CPR.  Having been involved in Mandla’s treatment after his accident, Dr. Mallone
understands why Tumi has made a living will.  He can sympathize with her concerns and he tries
his best to aid her decision-making process.
The fact that Tumi is given the opportunity to discuss her living will on an annual basis greatly
enhances  her  relationship  with  Dr.  Mallone.   Tumi  trusts  him.   She  is  also  secure  in  the
knowledge that, should her living will suddenly take effect, Dr. Mallone is aware of her anxieties
and convictions.  This will allow him to proceed in a manner most fitting Tumi’s wishes.
A living will which requires doctor-patient discussion before signature – for example, about a
decision on CPR - could improve communication and enhance the doctor-patient relationship
(See  Appendix 2).   The fact  that  the procedure  is  explicitly stated in  the living will  can be
expected to draw a patient’s attention to its important complexities.  By making both doctor and
patient aware of the difficulties around CPR, it is hoped that one of them will bring the topic into
a discussion.  This could then open the door to discussing other aspects of the living will and
possible treatment decisions under different conditions.
4.4.2. The Elderly and the Living Will
Nigel is a resident in a retirement village and this year he is turning 68.  Apart from the odd ache
and pain, he is in good health.  Given Nigel’s proximity to other old people in the retirement
village he has witnessed many deaths.  He has seen some of his friends perish quickly, but in
great pain.  He has seen the agony of family members making decisions for an elderly mother or
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father who is no longer competent to do so.  He has seen that these family members often have
no idea about the treatment preferences of their elderly relative.  
Nigel does not wish for his life to be prolonged if he is in pain.  He also wishes to spare his
family the emotional grief of making decisions on his behalf.  Although he has discussed his
death with some of his friends, his medical knowledge is limited.  He would greatly value some
time with his doctor in order to express his preferences and better familiarise himself with the
courses of action available to him.
A young researcher, Miguel, then comes to conduct research in the retirement home.  He hands
out copies of a living will to all residents who have agreed to be part of his study.  Nigel receives
a copy of the living will and fills in the questionnaire that came with it.  He keeps the living will
and it gets him thinking.  
A few days later Nigel meets Dr. Lane, his doctor, for a general check-up.  He takes the living
will document with him.  He has not signed it or filled it in as there is a recommendation that it is
discussed with a doctor before signature.  When he goes into Dr. Lane’s office he presents the
living will and asks to discuss it.  Dr. Lane responds positively and with a tone of palpable relief
in her voice.  She had wanted to discuss end-of-life issues with Nigel for sometime now, but
given Nigel’s good health had found no easy way to bring up the topic.
During their conversation, Dr. Lane comes to know a lot more about Nigel, his life before the
retirement home and his present circumstances.  This knowledge better allows her to understand
Nigel’s reasons for making certain decisions regarding his health and future medical treatment.
This interaction between Nigel and Dr. Lane makes both feel more at ease.  Nigel trusts Dr. Lane
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who, for her part, feels a closer bond with Nigel.  After this encounter the two have a much more
open relationship.
This example shows how a living will can enhance the doctor-patient relationship.  Presenting a
living  will  form  to  one’s  doctor  can  initiate  discussion  of  sensitive  issues  which  are  often
avoided.   These  discussions  have  positive  knock-on  effects,  like  improved  trust  and
understanding between doctor and patient, all of which result in the eventual strengthening and
solidifying of the doctor-patient relationship.
4.4.3. Dementia and the Living Will
Mbali is 65 years old and has recently been diagnosed with dementia.  The disease is still in its
early  stages  and  the  subtle  changes  are  evident  to  only  those  closest  to  her.   In  spite  of  a
convincing  diagnosis,  Mbali  –  like  many  other  dementia  patients  –  is  in  denial  about  her
condition.  She still feels normal, functions properly and thinks straight.  Hence she is convinced
that her doctor, Dr. Mbete, must have made a mistake in his diagnosis.  
Mbali’s son, Sipiwe, is a successful lawyer.  In his field of work he is well aware that once his
mother’s  dementia  renders  her  incompetent  it  will  be  too  late  for  her  to  express  treatment
preferences.  Sipiwe worries that his mother is not accepting the reality of her disease.  As a
result she refuses to discuss her wishes for treatment with him and the rest of their family.  
Sipiwe calls Dr.  Mbete and voices his concerns.   Dr. Mbete replies that Sipiwe ought not to
worry; he has an idea which might help solve the problem.
During the following few weeks, at each of Mbali’s visits, Dr. Mbete hands her a living will
form and encourages her to look at it, ask him questions and express her concerns.  He tells
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Mbali that he encourages all his patients over 65 to make a living will or at least discuss their
preferences with him.
Dr. Mbete’s repeated references to the living will soon start paying off.  Mbali comes around to
the idea of recording her preferences for treatment.  She is still unconvinced about her dementia,
but she has accepted that action should be taken on her part ‘just in case’.  Dr. Mbete, having
discussed the living will document with Mbali at great length and over a long period of time, is
satisfied that he has properly gauged her wishes regarding her end-of-life treatment and care.
Mbali does not want to be tube fed and at such a time as this may be necessary she requests
palliative care with good pain control but no artificial nutrients.
Dr. Mbete suggests a meeting between Mbali, Sipiwe and himself so that they may all discuss
her  living will  and treatment  preferences.   Throughout  this process  the relationship between
Mbali and Dr. Mbete has been greatly enhanced.   Mbali knows that she can trust Dr. Mbete and
that he will have her best interests at heart when it comes to her future treatment.  She also feels
more at ease regarding dying now that she has expressed her concerns to others.  Dr. Mbete feels
empowered  to  treat  Mbali  in  a  manner  which  she  has  specified  and  he  also  feels  that  his
extensive interaction with Mbali will better allow him to comfort and reassure her family as she
nears the end of her life.
4.4.4. HIV and the Living Will
Dr. Lewis is a general practitioner with rooms in a large, public hospital.  Many of his patients
are HIV positive but given the stigma surrounding AIDS they do not like to talk about their
condition.  In a recent internet search, Dr. Lewis became aware of an HIV-specific Living Will
document (See Appendix 3).  With the permission of the authors, he had a simple information
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leaflet about the HIV-specific living will translated into three local languages and placed them in
the public toilet in his rooms.  The leaflet encourages all HIV positive patients to request an
HIV-specific living will document from Dr. Lewis should they want one18.  It also notes that the
living will can be discussed with Dr. Lewis.
The result of this action is that many of Dr. Lewis’ HIV-positive patients fill in an HIV-specific
living will.  Even those who do not agree to sign it still benefit from discussions regarding end-
of-life treatment with the doctor.
The overall effect of this stratagem is that Dr. Lewis’ relationship with many of his HIV-positive
patients is greatly enhanced.  These patients come to understand that they are not going to be
subject to discrimination.  Talking about AIDS also makes these patients feel more in control of
their condition.  This feeling of control makes it easier to maintain a positive attitude.
4.4.5. Conclusion
This section has presented four fictional cases illustrating ways in which the living will could
help enhance the doctor-patient relationship.
Can I now claim that these cases represent paradigms by virtue of their straightforwardness and
common outcome: that the living will, when introduced into the medical consultation process,
can help enhance the doctor-patient relationship?  
18 A situation like this needs to be handled with great sensitivity.  Dr. Lewis cannot offer an HIV-specific living will to
each of his patients as, if they happen to be HIV negative, it may look like discrimination on his part, or a
judgement based only on physical appearance.  It is much better then, when it comes to HIV, that patients
introduce the topic rather than Dr. Lewis.  He also has a good reason for placing the information leaflets in the
public toilet – this way people may look at the leaflet and take one without anybody else knowing, or making
assumptions, about it.  Obviously, not everyone sees the leaflet, but this is the best that can be done in such a
sensitive situation.
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Paradigmatic cases require evaluation according to the maxims pertaining to them.  When it
comes to the four cases presented above, these maxims are fairly clear (Vieth 1999: 51):
• The  wellbeing  of  the  patient  –  which  is  amplified  by  the  enhanced  doctor-patient
relationship.
• The wellbeing of third parties, such as family members or proxy decision makers.  This
is  amplified  by  the  enhanced  relationship  which  results  from the  doctor  or  patient
bringing the living will into medical consultation.  It is also augmented by a more open
relationship with the patient in which ambiguities regarding the patient’s condition are
clarified.
• The wellbeing of the doctor – which comes about as a result of an enhanced doctor-
patient  relationship.   The  doctor  faces  fewer  difficult  decisions  when  it  comes  to
predicting treatment preferences for patients.  The doctor can also be assured of the
patient’s trust and confidence.
The cases presented in Sections 4.4.1. – 4.4.4. can be considered good  paradigmatic cases as
they  represent  scenarios  of  unambiguous  moral  acceptability.   This  is  because  each  case
enhances  the  wellbeing  of  the  three  primary  agents  involved  in  the  process  of  medical
consultation: namely the doctor, patient and the patient’s family.
Although  these  hypothetical  situations  are  somewhat  idealistic,  they  do  pave  the  way  for
proposing a model by which all doctors and patients who wish to enhance their relationship may
do so.  This will be the subject of section 4.5.
4.5. Specific Objective E: A Practical Model
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Specific objective E of this research is to propose an outline for a system by which use of the
living will might become more widespread.  This would then lead to the enhancement of the
doctor-patient relationship for many.  
What  kind of  system should this  be?   Such a system could  have  as  its  basis  the following
considerations:
• A living will is  only valid if  made in sound mind, so there is no point in making it
available in palliative care dementia homes or ICUs.
• Making it available through general practitioners who build up a relationship with their
client base over a long period of time would be constructive.  It would allow for regular
updating of the living will as well as regular discussion regarding end-of-life decisions.  
• Having information about the living will freely available to the public in discreet settings
(for  example  in  practitioner  rooms)  would  also  be  helpful.   This  information  could
suggest  that  the  living  will  can  initiate  sensitive  discussions  and  it  could  detail  the
benefits of an enhanced doctor-patient relationship.
• Information about living wills could also be made available in the rooms of doctors who
service  retirement  homes  and  institutions  caring  for  the  aged.   This  research  has
suggested that old people would value the opportunity to talk about death and make a
living will.  They will also benefit from an enhanced doctor-patient relationship in this
case.
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It is clear that some kind of empirical research might be required in order to establish which of
these  proposals  would be most effective  when  it  comes to practically enhancing the doctor-
patient relationship.  I hope to one day do this research, perhaps as a PhD.
4.6. Conclusion
In this chapter I have combined my two prominent concepts – the living will and the doctor-
patient relationship – to show how the former can enhance the latter.  The final conclusions of
this research are presented in Chapter 5, below.
Chapter 5: Conclusion
82
5.1. Introduction
This chapter is a summary of my findings in this research.  In Section 5.2 I will present a brief
summary of my overall argument and the conclusions thereof.  In Section 5.3 I will conclude this
research report.
5.2. Living, Dying and the Living Will: A Summary of Conclusions
In this research I set out to establish whether use of the living will could enhance the doctor-
patient relationship.  
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 dealt with the two primary concepts of this research: the living will and
the doctor-patient relationship.  These chapters shed light on current thinking regarding these
topics.  Ethical analyses at the end of each chapter argued that both of the concepts are morally
acceptable and that each could be utilized in order to promote, on the whole,  ethically valid
medical practice.
In Chapter 4 I presented a synthesis of my results from the previous two chapters.  Here I drew
on relevant observations and conclusions in order to present a series of four hypothetical cases,
each  of  which  demonstrated  that  the  living  will  can  be  used  to  enhance  the  doctor-patient
relationship.  Following this conclusion I presented some ideas for a sustainable model by which
the living will may enhance the doctor-patient relationship in a practical manner.
5.3. Enhancing the Doctor-Patient  Relationship: Living, Dying and Use of  the Living Will  -
Conclusion
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We  study  medicine  and  practice  as  healthcare  professionals.   We  become  doctors,  nurses,
medical  technicians,  therapists,  medical  scientists  and  bioethicists  all  with  one  primary
expectation:  That we might do some good.  We spend our time focusing on life, preserving it,
sometimes at all costs.  But the ultimate end of life, death, is often not duly considered until it is
too late.
The living will deals with death, a subject which few wish to talk about and which, given its
sensitive nature, is a difficult concept to introduce into a conversation.  We view it with mixed
emotions: those in great  pain find relief in the idea of death.   Those suffering depression or
psychological  disorder  view  death  as  a  welcome  escape  from  a  life  which  has  become
unbearable.  Most people, however, view death with fear.  It is not confronted.  The “out of sight,
out of mind” approach is preferred.  Given this attitude, too many people enter the final chapter
of their lives feeling frightened, unsure, and that they are not in control of their destiny.  People
wonder if their wishes will be considered.  For those who are not surrounded by loved ones, this
can be a lonely and traumatic experience.  
A good relationship with a doctor is very helpful.  Doctors have medical expertise allowing them
to understand the physical and psychological condition of their patients in a way that a family
member may not be able to do.  Most importantly, on an idealistic level, medical professionals
want to do good.  
A doctor who has had a good relationship with a patient who is now dying is in the position to
reassure patient, family and friends that the right decisions are being made.  Even if the loved
one has not signed a living will, the fact is that somewhere, maybe 20 years ago, a doctor sat
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down, brought out a living will, gained some insight, enhanced a relationship and took a little
extra care.
Now, as this patient dies, there is a sense of relief.  There is the bodily relief that comes when a
life has taken its course; but also emotional relief.  This death was not complicated.  Everyone
knew  the  wishes  of  the  patient.   Everyone  agreed  that  decisions  made  would  have  been
acceptable to the patient.  There is a sense of ease about this death.  Some of the most troubling
aspects which death usually brings with it are not in evidence.
Good relationships and interpersonal communication have led to a more open, honest evaluation
of life and the bodily deterioration that it inevitably brings.  This has led to a good death.  The
closing of a chapter that could have been painful was instead more like the culmination of a
sharing, understanding doctor-patient relationship; brought about by use of the living will.
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Appendix 1
This example illustrates the way in which good communication between doctor and family, in
the case of ICU care, can help resolve conflict between these parties.  The example is taken from
Way et. al. (2002: 1343 – 1344).
Ms R, a 52 year old woman with severe rheumatoid
arthritis and chronic immobility, was brought to the
emergency department. Her health was poor, although
stable, until the morning of admission, when she
became disoriented and lethargic. She was admitted to
intensive care, where she was treated for septic shock
secondary to decubitus ulcers and for acute renal
failure. On the day after admission she was requiring
increasing doses of vasopressor drugs and developed
acute respiratory distress syndrome. Some members of
the intensive care team became increasingly concerned
about the "futile" care they felt they were providing. The
patient's family requested that the medical team "do
everything" to keep her alive.
 
The intensive care team arranged for a conference
with the family. The attending physician asked the
family to describe their understanding of the patient's
condition. The family was far more optimistic than her
physicians, thinking she had a 50% chance of recovery
to her former state of health. The attending physician
then asked the family to tell the team what Ms R was
like as a person. The team learnt that she had always
been full of energy and ready and eager to take on all
challenges. They were thus able to appreciate her
relatively good quality of life and role in her family.
 
The team then explained that Ms R's poor underlying
health and immune suppression meant that she was
unlikely to recover from the progressive septic shock.
They explained that high quality medical care is
defined both by improvement in health and, when
improvement is not possible, by ensuring comfort. The
family was unaware that most deaths in intensive care
occur after withdrawing or withholding life support
and, with that information, began to develop more
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trust The team reassured the family that they had time
to think everything over and that life support would
continue for as long as the family believed it was what
Ms R would want. They emphasized that withdrawal of
life support did not mean withdrawal of medical and
nursing care and that her pain and other symptoms
would continue to be monitored and treated. The
family felt supported by the team and relieved that
they had not been pressured into accepting withdrawal
of life support.
 
Ms R remained critically ill with multiple organ
dysfunction syndrome and showed no significant
improvement despite maximal therapy. After several
days, the family decided that Ms R would not have
wanted ongoing life support in this situation. The
team explained the process of withdrawing life
support. They informed the family that she would be
unlikely to survive for more than an hour after
withdrawal, although occasionally patients survive
longer. The team also asked about spiritual needs and
the family requested a chaplain.
 
Routine investigations were discontinued and all drugs
were stopped except for morphine and lorazepam.
Morphine and lorazepam were titrated to comfort
during terminal ventilator discontinuation. Ms R's
family returned to the bedside after her extubation
and she died within 30 minutes. A chaplain was with
the family when she died.
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Appendix 2
Attached in this Appendix is the Living Will Document of the Living Will Society of South
Africa.  It is reproduced here with the kind permission of Mrs. Brigid Raw, Director of SAVES:
The South African Living Will Society (2008).  The instruction page of this living will states that
it is “imperative” to discuss its contents with one’s doctor.  The actual will itself contains a DNR
clause.  This DNR clause pertains specifically to those whom have decided to forego
cardiopulmonary resuscitation.
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Appendix 3
This Appendix contains a copy of the University of Toronto’s Joint Centre for Bioethics “HIV
Specific  Living  Will”.   It  is  copied  here  with  the  permission  of  Peter  Singer  (2008),  the
document’s creator.  Instructions as to how this living will should be filled in are also included in
the Appendix.
THE HIV SPECIFIC LIVING WILL
THE INSTRUCTION DIRECTIVE 
The first part of the instruction directive is the Treatment Table. Please refer back to Chapter 3,
"Information About HIV/AIDS Health Care Decisions," for descriptions of the health situations
and life-sustaining treatments used in the Treatment Table. 
For each of the health situations (found in the first column of the table), imagine that you are in
the situation described, and then you develop a further medical problem that requires some life-
sustaining treatment (found in the top row of the table). If you do not receive this treatment, you
would die. If you receive the treatment, the chance that you will live depends on the nature of the
medical problem. Even if you recover fully from the medical problem, you would return to the
health situation you were in before you developed the further medical problem. 
As an example, imagine that, at some future time, you suffer from moderate dementia. Then, you
develop  pneumonia  requiring  life-saving  antibiotics.  Without  the  antibiotics,  you  would die.
With  the  antibiotics,  your  chance  of  surviving  depends  on  the  nature  and  severity  of  the
pneumonia. Of course, even if the antibiotics were successful in treating your pneumonia, you
would still have moderate dementia. 
You should then decide whether or not you would want the particular treatment (antibiotics) if
you were in this condition (moderate dementia.
TO COMPLETE THE TABLE
Write your treatment decision ("YES", "NO", "UNDECIDED," or "TRIAL") in the box for every
combination of health situation and treatment. 
Take the example from the previous page and imagine again that  you  suffer  from moderate
dementia. If in that situation you would want life-saving antibiotics, if they were the only hope of
saving  your  life,  you  would  write  "YES"  in  the  box  found  where  the  column  marked
"Antibiotics" and the row marked "Moderate Dementia" meet. If you would not want antibiotics
in  those  circumstances,  write  "NO"  in  that  box.  If  you  are  undecided,  you  would  write
"UNDECIDED." 
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One other option is possible. In some cases, it may be unclear initially whether a given treatment
will be beneficial or not. In these cases, you may want to try the treatment for an appropriate
period, usually a few days to a couple of weeks. During this time your doctors would monitor
and assess the effectiveness of the treatment and determine how beneficial it was for you. If the
treatment proved to be beneficial, it could be continued. If not, it could be stopped. If you wish
such a treatment trial, then write "TRIAL" in the box. For CPR and surgery, a treatment trial is
not appropriate because these treatments are given all at once in a short time. 
Then, the rest of the boxes may be filled in, by imagining yourself in each health situation and
that you require each of the life-sustaining treatments listed.
CPR Ventilator Surgery Blood
transfusion
Life Saving
Antibiotics
Tube
Feeding
Current
Health
with
Potentially
Reversible
Illness
Chronic
Illness
with
Physical
Disability
Mild
Dementia
Moderate
Dementia
Severe
Dementia
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